



COUNTRY CHAPTER  
**SUDAN**




# Baseline Study Sudan

The Learning and Evaluation Team (LET) of the **Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP)** is conducting an impact evaluation (2017-2020) of the integrated approach to refugee and host communities.


Results from the baseline are used to inform practice in 2019, and to measure progress at the 2020 endline.

## BASELINE


April – May 2018 • 803 households surveyed in/around Wad Sharifey: 400 refugees and 403 hosts • Case study in Um Gargour, additional in-depth interviews in (closed) Um Golgha camp • Key informant interviews with main stakeholders




## KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE: WAD SHARIFEY




## AVERAGE SCORES IN DOMAINS OF ENVIRONMENT, LIVELIHOODS AND PROTECTION ACCORDING TO RDPP METRIC



## RDPP PROGRAMME AREAS & IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS



## KEY FINDINGS\*



### RELEVANCE

Livelihoods creation clearly relevant in Sudan. National policies technically prevent refugees from working, but Eritrean refugees often blend in with local population.



### ADAPTIVENESS

The only IP active at the time of the baseline, GIZ has shown adaptiveness by adjusting training schedules and designing outcomes-based M&E tools.



### COORDINATION

Highly challenging given the number of national stakeholders involved. Lack of cooperation has led to significant delays.



### SUSTAINABILITY

Financial burden-sharing with the government can contribute to financial sustainability, but officials do not generally see RDPP as a holistic intervention.

\*Livelihoods component only, other activities delayed

## MAIN TAKEAWAYS

### OVERALL

Prioritise basic humanitarian needs (food, water, health) while pursuing more development-oriented initiatives.

Explicit and entrenched encampment policy obstructs durable solutions.

### STRUCTURAL

Strengthen communication among RDPP partners, conduct careful and conflict-sensitive assessment of changed government setup and its implications on RDPP activities.

Agree on common monitoring framework.

### ACTIVITY SPECIFIC

Identify obstacles at different administrative echelons to commence crucial health and WaSH programming.

Implement tracer studies to verify impact of TVET.

### DONORS

Regular joint international advocacy.

Focus on strengthening knowledge and capacity in agricultural value chains to support move beyond subsistence farming.

# RDPP in Sudan: The case of Eastern Sudan

## Presentation of the case study: scope and methodology

This chapter presents an overview of the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) in Sudan, with a focus on the Eastern region. Our study draws on quantitative data collected in the camp of Wad Sharifey, Kassala, in the spring of 2018, as well as qualitative data concerning the Um Gargour and Um Golgha camps near Shagarab in Gedarif State. It also relies on a comprehensive desk review of relevant project documentation. We carried out the qualitative data collection, consisting of 17 focus group discussions and 12 key informant interviews, in a different location from that targeted by the quantitative survey for reasons of timeline (Ramadan) and for logistical considerations (the approach of the rainy season and permit delays). The combination of the two settings offers a holistic representation of conditions in the region, rather than a snapshot of one camp in particular. Data collection for this study precedes the events of April 2019, which saw President Omar al-Bashir removed from power by the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The RDPP in Sudan aims to address root causes of displacement in conflict-affected areas that are also migratory routes, such as Darfur, East Sudan or the Transitional Areas. Actions focus on the most vulnerable populations (including refugees and host communities) in peripheral and urban areas, promoting resilience and secure livelihoods through programmes on education, health, food security, nutrition, livestock, and protection. With a total budget of EUR 15 million, the project focuses on the areas of Kassala, Gedaref and the capital of Khartoum.

The inhabitants of these camps are supported by RDPP via vocational training carried out by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Elsewhere in Sudan, UNIDO focuses on vocational training in the urban area of Khartoum while UNHCR carries out child protection programming for refugees in Khartoum and Shagarab. A project by the Italian Development Corporation focusing on health services and a broad economic development programme centred around agribusiness by RVO had not yet commenced at the time of the baseline data collection. Finally, Landell Mills was tasked with capacity building for State authorities, focusing mainly on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Kassala.

This report is divided into five sections:

1. In [Key messages](#), we summarise fundamental trends, action points, and findings that have emerged from the baseline, providing an overview and summary of the overall report.
2. [Stuck for decades](#) offers a narrative of the context within which RDPP operates in Sudan, specifically in the camps in the East. The section explores details and aspects that inform the lives of host and refugee communities and stakeholders in the region.
3. The two central sections, [Evaluating needs on the ground](#) and [How are these needs on the ground being met](#), introduce key quantitative and qualitative data and indicators that will enable us to measure RDPP's impact in Eastern Sudan.
4. In the final section, [Conclusion and Recommendations](#), we outline strategies to address gaps highlighted in the central sections of the report. This includes, as **a way forward to the endline, the presentation of an RDPP outcome metric for Sudan to allow for a monitoring of the impact of programming** on the key variables identified for this location.

## I. Key messages

Refugee and host populations display relatively similar characteristics in Wad Sharifey, perhaps owing to the protracted nature of displacement there – and despite a strict official encampment policy. Both hosts and refugees face challenges in meeting their basic needs and suffer from alarming levels of food insecurity. Water is a grave concern, and levels of health and sanitation universally dismal. RDPP-funded projects target health promotion and foster agribusiness, both highly relevant in this context; neither had commenced at the time of the baseline due to delays experienced in the planning phase.

There is room for improvement on the issue of social cohesion: while the majority of refugee respondents have positive views of their host community, the opposite is not true. People distrust the camp committees, which are sometimes perceived as corrupt when it comes to distribution of agricultural land and other benefits. There is a degree of social integration within ethnic groups, but only very limited interaction across groups. Overtly stated migration intentions are the exception to the rule.

Indicators regarding participation in the labour market show no meaningful difference between refugee and host cohorts. The share of active employed individuals is slightly lower for refugees than hosts, though not drastically so. There is a difference, however, in women's activity: Eritrean refugee women are rarely seen working outside their homes, while many of the Sudanese women are active. Conditions for refugees are difficult for a number of reasons, chief among which is documentation. Legal work opportunities for refugees are almost non-existent without some level of document fraud. Access to finance is limited.

An RDPP-funded GIZ project focuses on improving the economic conditions and general welfare of youth populations through technical and vocational training (TVET) in selected trades. This was the only RDPP activity ongoing at the time of the baseline. Although it has suffered from a number of challenges, it also presents an example of what can be achieved (and what cannot) in a difficult context. GIZ sought to provide inclusive trainings, targeting both hosts and refugees and both men and women. The opportunities for graduates to use their newly acquired skills, however, are limited, particularly for refugees who are not legally allowed to pursue opportunities outside the camp. Refugees offered to be resettled elsewhere in Sudan chose to stay, citing the relatively more affordable camp life and access to free services as a reason.

GIZ has attempted to adapt to the unforeseen circumstances by adjusting training schedules to a timeframe shorter than they had originally anticipated. The organisation has also set up an evaluation framework that goes beyond sheer output indicators and is planning to conduct tracer studies to evaluate the success of graduates on the labour market. Coordination has been a challenge throughout given the number of national stakeholders involved. Sustainability cannot yet be assessed. The burden sharing between GIZ and the Ministry of Finance might contribute to financial sustainability. But given the policy context, it is unlikely that the project will make a significant contribution in the long run. It is too soon to evaluate the business development aspects, as these activities were yet to start at the time of the baseline.

The report presents **a set of recommendations to be shared and discussed with implementing partners**. The aim of these is to obtain their feedback and agree on a way forward for the second half of RDPP's timeline in Eastern Sudan. Agreeing on common objectives can improve the results for the endline.

## II. Stuck for decades

Sudan lies at the centre of the Eastern African migration route towards North Africa and Europe; it is a place of origin, transit and destination for refugees and migrants in the entire region. Sudan hosts over 900,000 (UNHCR 2017) refugees and asylum seekers in camps and urban areas and 2 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR 2017). The South Sudanese represent the largest group of displaced persons in the country. The Eritreans are another important demographic, with close to 90,000 residing in the Kassala and Gedaref region. The displacement situation in Sudan has become protracted, both for Sudanese citizens displaced internally and for refugees from neighbouring countries. At the same time, the Eastern region has recently witnessed an on-going influx of new arrivals from Eritrea and South Sudan.

Currently undergoing grave upheaval due to the 2019 *Coup d'État*, the national authorities are crucial stakeholders in the Sudanese refugee response: several ministries – including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice – the Commissioner for Refugees (COR), the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), and the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) are non-negotiable counterparts for all international organisations involved in humanitarian and development affairs. In Eastern Sudan, on which this study focuses, the camps are generally managed by the Commissioner for Refugees (COR) although certain ‘closed camps’ are managed by the Sudanese National Intelligence Security Service (NISS).<sup>1</sup> Nobody can enter these camps without permission - they are not accessible to SRC, WFP, UNHCR or other INGOs.

The legal, policy and institutional environment in Sudan as pertaining to refugees is generally restrictive: the country practices a strict encampment policy, is not part of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, and has not set up any kind of structured dialogue on development. The previous Bashir Government had not been supportive of an approach aiming to integrate refugees into host communities through the provision of basic services and livelihoods opportunities<sup>2</sup> - what impact the new government landscape will have on refugee programming remains unclear.

There are nine refugee camps in Eastern Sudan operated by UNHCR and its partners (one in Gedarif State and eight in Kassala State). Established decades ago (mostly in the 70s and 80s) and run and serviced by UNCHR in a parallel system, their locations were at the time strategically chosen to contribute to local economic cycles, for instance during harvests or to contribute to irrigation schemes. However, today, in a classic ‘encampment’ setting, refugees need a travel permit from COR to leave the camps. They also need a work permit from the state-level representations of the Ministry of Labour and Administrative Reform (Department of Labour) to engage in economic activities. These permits are not generally granted. Refugees cannot own property.

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<sup>1</sup> This is also the case in Darfur. The sites hosting South Sudanese refugees in White Nile State, however, are managed by the local authorities and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society.

<sup>2</sup> This strict regime concerns almost exclusively Eritreans and Ethiopians: Refugees from South Sudan (and Syria) have the same rights as Sudanese citizens.

**Map 1 - Locations of fieldwork**



**Wad Sharifey** camp is one of the oldest and largest camps in Kassala. It is mainly inhabited by Eritreans. Many Sudanese have gravitated towards it to benefit from camp infrastructures, living both in and around the camp, while protracted refugees have integrated with the host community both socially and economically. Also established decades ago, crowded **Um Gargour** Camp lies about 125 km to the south-west as the crow flies. The approximately 14,000 persons living there are mainly Eritrean Muslims. It is the only open refugee camp in Gedarif State. We conducted additional focus groups discussions with Ethiopian refugees in the proximity of the neighbouring **Um Golgha** camp, which is now closed – the area hosts close to 2,200 Ethiopians. These camps are located in agricultural settings.

**Photo 1 and 2 - The road to Um Gargour**



The inhabitants of these camps are supported by RDPP via vocational training carried out by GIZ. Elsewhere in Sudan, UNIDO focuses on vocational training in the urban area of Khartoum while UNHCR carries out child protection programming for refugees in Khartoum and Shagarab. A project by the Italian Development Corporation focusing on health services, and a broad economic development programme centered around agribusiness by RVO had not yet commenced at the time of the baseline data collection.

**Table 1 - RDPP activities in Sudan as of May 2018**

SECTOR	ACTIVITY	IP
Child protection	Child protection in Khartoum and Shagarab	UNHCR
Livelihoods	Vocational training in Kassala and Gedarif	GIZ
	Vocational training in Khartoum	UNIDO
	Economic development (Agribusiness) in Kassala and Gedarif (not started at time of baseline)	RVO
Water and sanitation, health (WASH)	WASH in Kassala (not started at time of baseline)	Italian Development Corporation (AICS)
Government capacity	Capacity building of State Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Kassala (not started at time of baseline)	Landell Mills

This baseline will thus focus on the vocational training component. As part of this component, GIZ is providing vocational training in selected trades with the aim of developing local businesses. Training colleges are offering vocational courses, including short introductory sessions and a one-year dual course for four different occupations. The target number of beneficiaries is at least 500. At the same time, specific capacity-building measures were put in place for 50 local SMEs.

### III. Evaluating needs on the ground

The refugee and host community populations sampled in East Kassala, Sudan, are on average around 24 years old. Just under half of both refugees and hosts are female. Around one in three individuals covered by the survey were married. Refugee households are similar to host community households in terms of size with an average of six members. Likewise, the dependency ratio is the same measured by the number of typically non-working-age members (e.g. children and elderly) relative to working-age members.

The refugee and host populations are qualitatively similar in Eastern Sudan, perhaps owing to the protracted nature of the refugee context. Nearly all refugees encountered in Wad Sharifey originate from Eritrea. The median year of their household's arrival in Sudan is 1984 – about half of the interviewed refugee population were born in Sudan. Of those born outside the country, 85% are registered with UNHCR.

The following sections present baseline data across a range of relevant indicators. Covering both humanitarian ('Basic needs') as well as development-oriented dimensions, some categories are directly addressed by RDPP-funded activities in Sudan (e.g. food security and health), while others are introduced to provide information about context and with a view to facilitating comparison to other country chapters in this regional research project.




## a. Basic needs

**Table 2 - Key indicators for monitoring – Basic needs**

		Hosts	Refugees
Food security	Not had food to eat in the house in past month	42%	17%
	Did not worry about not having enough food in past month	32%	14%
Housing	Owens or rents shelter	84%	70%
	Owens or rents land	17%	8%
Water and wash	Tap as primary water source	72%	28%
	Borehole as primary water source	0%	0%
	Access to private pit latrines	32%	76%
Waste and infrastructure	Does not find that there is a lot of garbage outside	7%	11%
	Does not throw garbage outside dwelling for disposal	93%	81%
	Has grid access	84%	6%
	Has access to a generator (government, private, community)	71%	29%
	Has solar (private)	3%	0%
Health	Children having received vaccinations (full or partial)	68%	72%
	Covered by health insurance	69%	34%
	Sought out treatment after suffering serious illness or injury***	99%	99%
	Judged treatment to be of high quality	68%	69%
Safety and protection	Feel completely or mostly safe	98%	92%
	Sought out protection after a legal problem***	71%	78%
	Content with the protection received***	53%	86%
	Feel they can turn to the local authorities in case of need	81%	82%

The population of Sudan as a whole is chronically **food-insecure** – WFP estimates that four inhabitants out of five are unable to afford the food they need on a daily basis to live a healthy life. It is the same for the sample surveyed in Wad Sharifey: 68% of hosts and 86% of refugees expressed concerns about being able to feed themselves and their families over the past four weeks. Self-reported food insecurity is an important measure. 61% of refugees report their household does not have enough food to eat, compared to 37% of host respondents.

**Figure 1 - In the past four weeks, was there ever any food to eat of any kind in your household because of a lack of resources?**



Food aid is provided by WFP (focusing on the most vulnerable households, particularly the elderly) as well as certain Muslim organisations such as Al Ihsan and Rahma who distribute ‘fasten bags’. The latter are not affiliated with the COR but communicate directly with the NISS and camp administration, to direct aid to those the most in need (orphans, widows, the disabled).



**Photo 3** - *The exception? Temporary dwellings in Wad Sharifey*

Both groups are unlikely to reside in temporary **housing** like a makeshift shelter or tent (4% and 1% respectively). The predominant construction material for refugee homes' roofs is mud (94%), whereas host community homes' roofs are made of brick (42%), mud (41%) and concrete (16%).


The same share of refugee and hosts told us they own their current dwelling (68%). However, refugees are more likely to be living in their home for free with authorisation (30% vs 15%), and less likely to rent (2% vs 16%).

The rate of land ownership or rental is slightly lower for refugees (8% vs 18%). All refugees who own or rent land use it to grow food or as pasture for livestock (almost exclusively for their own usage). This is only the case for two host households out of three; the rest choose to rent their land to others or let it lie barren.

### MOVING BEYOND SUBSISTENCE – EVENTUALLY?

Although the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO)'s Agribusiness programme in Kassala had not yet commenced at the time of the 2018 baseline, its relevance to the setting of Wad Sharifey is clear. Refugees' knowledge and interest in growing food and livestock on lands constitutes a base to build upon in terms of outreach, and the fact that a fair share of hosts appears to have access to land which is currently not being used speaks to potential for growth. What little activity there is in terms of agribusiness is limited to subsistence production. Strengthening knowledge and capacity in agricultural value chains might go a long way in transitioning from subsistence farming to more sustainable livelihoods.

**Water** is a concern for people in Wad Sharifey and the area as a whole – the water available from wells is too salty to use for cooking or drinking, and frequently unavailable during the summer months when the wells dry up. In Wad Sharifey, potable water is brought from El Sawagi in barrels pulled by donkeys and is available at a price which fluctuates considerably. In Um Gargour, SRC operates four water wheels (tankers) in the camp. Water from those must also be purchased. Refugees rely on vendors / tankers more than hosts (72% vs 27%). Close to three quarters of the host community we interviewed around Wad Sharifey have access to either shared (47%) or private (25%) tap water.



Photos 4/5 - A scarce resource



Photo 6 - Electricity available in the market area only

Relatedly, **sanitation** represents a greater issue for refugees than hosts in and around Wad Sharifey. 44% of hosts report having access to a private flush toilet.

One refugee respondent in five have no toilet (a health and security concern according to informants), and half only have access to uncovered pit latrines.

Four out of five host community households we surveyed have access to the **electricity grid**, compared to only 7% of refugees in Wad Sharifey. In Um Gargour, solar energy was provided by UNHCR to power the administrative area housing the police station, CoR hub, hospital and market. Even those who do have access to the grid complain of high cost and frequent outages, particularly during the rainy season. Most refugees rely on batteries and charge their phones at charging points.

Rumour of a dam being constructed to improve electricity supply are circulating but the population is not aware of a date for completion. The most common cooking fuel is charcoal. Fuel shortages were felt throughout (and had an important effect on) this study's fieldwork.

**Garbage** is omnipresent. Over half of hosts and refugees in and around Wad Sharifey to whom we spoke told us that there is a lot of it cluttering their living space. Six refugees out of ten dispose of trash in allocated areas, compared to less than half of the hosts. In Um Gargour, Islamic Relief provided bins in the main squares, roads and market spaces. Take-up has been limited.

**Health** risks in the area revolve mainly around diarrhoea, malaria, high blood pressure and osteoporosis. There are a few cases of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. People believe they get sick from impure water, expired fertilizers used by farmers, chemicals in food etc. One host in four and one refugee household in five in Wad Sharifey have faced serious illness or injury over the past month. Of those, almost everyone sought treatment at government health facilities (60%) or private ones (38% of hosts, 15% of refugees). Refugees also used NGO-run health facilities (20%). Public hospitals lack equipment, decent-quality medicines and staff. Private clinics are thought to provide better service, but at a high cost.

## WAITING ON HEALTH PROMOTION

The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation's "Promoting health Services in East Sudan" project had not commenced at the time of the baseline. The project will focus on improving the health status of vulnerable people, particularly in remote areas or localities in Kassala. Collaborating closely with the State Ministry of Health, the project's goals are to strengthen sustainability and quality of the health system in the region, for hosts and refugees alike.

Focusing on measures of **safety**, both refugees and host respondents in Wad Sharifey are overwhelmingly likely to report feeling safe in their communities. Of the few who did not feel safe, the most common source was incidents (e.g. discrimination, harassment, violence, theft) with others in their community, whereas some refugees also worried about their proximity to the border. Around the same amount of refugee and host respondents believe women are particularly at risk (22% and 19%, respectively). These figures seem to under-report the scale of issues faced by women in light of anecdotes shared with us during the qualitative phase of our work. These highlight that many women, particularly in closed camps where access is limited, are involved in sex work.

Despite a plethora of laws passed to combat trafficking,<sup>3</sup> it is a common phenomenon, either part of an arrangement or as a result of kidnapping. Primitive weapons such as knives and swords are common. Ethiopians in particular report feeling unsafe:

*"They have their own view of prostitution of non-Muslims. We don't feel safe here. We are a minority here and I feel the Eritreans hate us, because we are not Muslim. There are many sexual harassment incidents, but the CoR does not care about them. They claim the situation is under control, but it is not".*

Ethiopian refugee

Respondents in Wad Sharifey and surroundings feel that they could turn to someone in case of need: hosts view the responsiveness of the national and local government more positively, while refugees view NGOs more positively. Specifically, refugees view the responsiveness of UNHCR very positively. Moreover, both refugees and hosts believe they can turn to a local authority if they have a dispute or experience conflict (82% and 81% respectively).

<sup>3</sup> In November 2013, Gedaref state enacted its Immigration and Human Trafficking Law and similar laws were passed in Kassala. In March 2014, an anti- trafficking legislation was signed into law, which prescribes between three- and ten-years' imprisonment for acts of trafficking, between five and twenty years' imprisonment for aggravated trafficking, and capital punishment in cases where the trafficking victim dies or in cases involving other serious crimes, such as rape (The Combating of Human Trafficking Act, 2014). Adoption of this legislation was supported by the establishment of a National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking. Its effectiveness reportedly remains limited.

## b. Education and livelihoods

**Table 3 - Key indicators for monitoring – Education and Livelihoods**

		Hosts	Refugees
Education	Regular school attendance	70%	56%
	Integrated school attendance	32%	86%
	Fewer than 50 children per teacher	37%	17%
	Quality of education judged high or very high	39%	33%
	Assistance to attend school (uniform, shoes, books...)	2%	10%
	School-feeding programme	15%	14%
Livelihoods	In paid work or self-employed	34%	31%
	Earned redundancy (more than one income earner)	32%	15%
	Among working population, hosts working inside and refugees working inside camp	5%	47%
	Among working population, formal contract	34%	4%
	Among working population, holds skill certification	32%	3%
	Among working population, working five or more days per week	100%	97%
	Average income for households with at least one working family member*	\$21	\$28
	Average monthly expenditures*	\$90	\$54

\*exchange rate March 2019

Parents' education mirrors that of the children. On average, adult refugee head of households are more likely to have no formal schooling. Conversely, host community members are more likely to have completed secondary and tertiary education (e.g. bachelor's degree or higher).

In addition, self-reported literacy differs considerably across the two groups with 60% of refugees indicating the ability to read and write in comparison to 84% of host community members.



70% of sampled host children but only slightly more than half of sampled refugee children of school age attend school regularly. Refugee respondents are much more likely to report their children attending integrated schools in comparison to host respondents (87% vs 32%). The average number of children per teacher is nearly equal for both at 54.

The quality of education is perceived as low. Classes are crowded and teachers lowly paid. Many schools lack electricity and water.

**Photo 7 - Primary school in Wad Sharifey**

Education is free, but it is still expensive for parents due to costs for registration fee, books, exercise books, school uniform, and school meals. Camps also host madrassas, such as the one founded by the Eritrean Rahma organisation. Those institutions have their own syllabus and teaching staff.

*“Could this “parallel” system of education become a source of religious extremism in the camps? I don’t think so. Most camp inhabitants are moderate Muslims and the schools only provide education. We understand that the majority here are opposed to the current regime in Eritrea, but they are aware that the Sudanese government prohibits political activities in the camp”.*

Commissioner of Refugees, Um Gargour

**Livelihoods** programming in Sudan takes place in a challenging context: inflation is soaring due to steeply increasing fuel prices, while the economy is crippled by sanctions (since lifted) and borrowing constraints. The secession of South Sudan brought with it the loss of the majority of oil revenue. States in Eastern Sudan (the focus of RDPP programming) are comparatively even worse off than other areas. Economic opportunities here revolve mainly around the agricultural sector (which is however vulnerable to drought). Competition for the limited number of agricultural jobs is harsh: local farmers contract locals but also refugees (informally, for very low wages) as well as seasonal workers from Eritrea and Ethiopia. This appears to be tolerated by the authorities.

With respect to employment, there is no meaningful difference between working-age refugees and host community members in terms of being active on the labour market (i.e. either currently working or looking for work if unemployed). This is a sign that although refugees are not officially allowed to work, some informal labour market integration does occur in protracted displacement contexts in Sudan particularly for refugee populations culturally accepted among the Sudanese (i.e. Eritrean Muslims).


The share of those active individuals employed is slightly lower for refugees than hosts (66% vs. 71%), though not significantly so. The type of employment is similar across the two groups. Specifically, hosts community members active on the labour market are slightly more likely to be involved in paid work than refugees (39% vs 33%), yet there is little difference in self-employment and refugees are more likely to be unemployed (34% vs 29%).

In terms of the respondents’ view of local economic opportunities, 6% of refugees perceive opportunities as poor or very poor compared to only 42% of host respondents.

The type of employer hiring waged individuals differs across the two groups. Refugees are almost just as likely to work for a private firm as they are for their own family (45% and 46% respectively). Many cultivate crops but during the rainy season complain about lack of land and tractors. Camp inhabitants also work in livestock - herds of sheep and goats populate the area. Other activities in the camp are petty trade, electricity, tractor maintenance, small agricultural equipment manufacturing and maintenance, telephone maintenance and food processing. Others work as drivers or on construction sites.

Conversely, host community members involved in paid work are predominately employed by the government (42%) and to a lesser degree family business (27%) and the private sector (26%).

**Figure 2 - What was this person's primary daily activity during the past 12 months?**



For self-employment, the majority of refugee and host community members are involved in small-scale business activity like trading (64% and 83%, respectively). Farming and herding are less important activities but still considerable especially for refugees in comparison to hosts (25% and 10%).

Eritrean refugee women are rarely seen working outside their own house. Many of the Sudanese women run small shops, selling *kissra*, *tallih*, and traditional perfumes, traditional items of food *weyka*, *shata*, and handicraft products. Some work in childcare, as housecleaners, or in an organisation or business. Their work is not always seen without criticism:

“Men think that women working in the market are prostitutes, but we don’t care. We are working to improve our financial situation and for the sake of our families and children”.

**Host woman**


Concerning other relevant employment-related characteristics, half of refugees work exclusively within Wad Sharifey camp (53%), whereas most hosts work outside the camp (95%).

Employed refugees are less likely to have a formal position with a written contract in comparison to hosts (4% vs 34%). Although both groups work on average six days per week, household income differs considerably: the total income in an average week for host households with at least one employed household member is around SDG 1,350, while it is just SDG 985 for refugee households. This difference may reflect systematically lower wages for refugee workers, though it may also be due to the higher likelihood of host community households to be comprised of more than one employed household member in comparison to refugee households (32% vs 17%). Host community households are found to have a meaningfully higher monthly expenditures on all items including food, housing, medical expenses, debt repayment, water, electricity and all other.

A regression analysis confirms that residing in Wad Sharifey camp will, while controlling for individual characteristics such as age, gender, marital status and education of the head of household, result in lower expenditure; but refugees are not less likely to be employed. Host and refugee female-headed households are less likely to be employed.<sup>4</sup>

Beyond objective indicators of welfare, subjective measures vary considerably among respondents. A significantly higher share of host community households views their current economic situation neutrally (e.g. coping) or positively (e.g. comfortable or very comfortable), whereas a considerably number of refugee households view their situation negatively (e.g. difficult or very difficult).

**Figure 3 - How do you see this household's current economic situation?**



Conditions are difficult for a number of reasons, chief among them documentation. Legal work opportunities for refugees are near non-existent without some level of document fraud:

“I wish I could have a Sudanese National Identity Number. All people in the camp have one. They can pay something like 3,000 SDG, to get it. Someone working in Sudan Civil Registration Authority in Halfa City said he can help me to issue this document, but I don't have the money. If I want to go and work outside the camp”.

**Refugee respondent**

If Eritreans are generally able to acquire Sudanese IDs, this is rare for their Ethiopian peers. However, lack of ID is not the only impediment to integration. Many refugees who do have IDs and were offered to resettle elsewhere in Sudan in the early 2000s chose to stay, deciding that living in a camp provided better prospects for them than the comparatively pricier city life. The availability of free services likely also played a role in their decision. This phenomenon is illustrated by a closer analysis of a subset of host households living on the very edge of Wad Sharifey camp, who were on average 13 percentage points more likely to have work than their peers in more remote locations. These nearby hosts are typically engaged in informal self-employment activities – specifically, small-scale family businesses (e.g. trading) – and are around 20 percentage points more likely to be doing business within the camp itself compared to other hosts. This reflects how **the camp economy provides market opportunities not only for refugees themselves, but host community households that are well placed to take advantage of them.**

<sup>4</sup> Given that effect sizes / coefficients are not easily interpretable for non-scalar response variables, they are not presented in this report.



Corruption is perceived to be a common challenge:

“We are working to encourage other youth to actively engage in community development, but you know youth are very discouraged by the hardship in livelihood activities, and unfair employment opportunities distribution amongst youth due to corruption, and political favours”.

Sudanese youth leader in Gedarif

Finally, **access to finance is limited**. There are various sources of loans with different terms and conditions such as banks, microfinance institutions, which used to provide loans for youth to start their income generating activities. Women in farming can have loans from the agricultural bank. However, interviewees do not have easy access to such loans.



Photos 8 and 9 - Scarce: sources of finance

## MAKING THE BEST OF A CHALLENGING SITUATION: TVET

The GIZ project is designed to improve the economic conditions and general welfare of trained youth and their families in an integrated fashion. Trainees are partly trained in the Vocational Training Centre and partly in private workshops, 48 have been identified after surveying 374 workshops. Selection criteria were availability of tools and equipment, and safety features. Trades were identified based on a survey. In Gedarif, for instance, the four-month courses focus on small engine repair, cooling / refrigerating, electrician work and welding. Women are trained in food processing, tailoring, handicrafts and mobile maintenance.

### c. Social cohesion

Table 4 - Key indicators for monitoring – Social cohesion

	Hosts	Refugees
Deem living conditions of refugees to be better than those of hosts	41%	26%
Think that authorities treat refugees better than hosts	27%	24%
Have not experienced conflict with the other group in the past month	26%	93%
Believe economic integration is on the rise	71%	81%
Believe social integration is on the rise	67%	87%
Have a positive or very positive opinion of the other	51%	80%

While the majority of refugee respondents have positive views of the host community (81%), the share of host respondents that views refugees positively is considerably lower (52%). In fact, a quarter of host respondents openly express negative views of refugees. While trust in one’s own community is shown to be high, trust in community leaders is low. People distrust the camp committees, who are perceived as corrupt when it comes to distribution of agricultural land and other benefits.

With respect to subjective circumstances, 38% of refugees believe their own living conditions are worse in comparison to the host community. One host community respondent out of four believes refugees are treated better by authorities and agencies. These subjective measures do not reveal a great source of tension between the two groups. Still, a considerable share of host respondents experienced conflict with a refugee (73%), even though refugees do not similarly report such incidences (7%). This result hints at the presence of a minority among refugees who might be disturbing the peace with their host neighbours. There is social integration within ethnic groups, but only very limited interaction across groups. In recent years Hawsa and other Western Sudanese tribes have started to settle in Eastern Sudan, competing for work on the agricultural lands. They have a negative attitude towards the Ethiopians in particular:

“We don’t interact with them. They perceive us as criminals. Maybe because we stay awake until late nights, drinking alcohol. But we don’t hurt others. They came here once and attacked us, and tried to force us to move from here”.

**Ethiopian refugee**

#### d. Migration intentions

**Table 5 - Key indicators for monitoring – Migration intentions of surveyed individuals**

	Hosts	Refugees
Would like to migrate, but no concrete plans	12%	13%
Plan to migrate	10%	11%
Of those who plan to migrate, report planning to use formal channels***	99%	98%
Have been provided information about the risks of irregular migration	90%	82%

Only a minority of respondents noted wishing to, or planning to, migrate. Returning the country of origin, is not considered a valid option.

Eritreans left home a long time ago due to conflict, the oppressive regime, lack of livelihoods and basic necessities. Only 13% of refugees interviewed are still in contact with friends or family ‘back home’. Fewer than 5% send remittances.

“Unless this dictatorship regime ends, no one can go back. We have some who returned back to Eritrea in 1995 and 1996, but they come back to Sudan. They had been put in jail. This regime is not providing any human rights guarantees, and no religious freedom. The current regime aims to obliterate Islam”.

**Eritrean refugee**

Those who do open up about migration plans, often in qualitative interviews, dream of migrating to America, European countries, Canada or Australia. Some have friends there but lack clear information to migrate. Eritrean women support men’s migration, although it can lead to new forms of social problems, as seen in an increased number of divorces.

Through internet and social media, refugees have learned about the possibility of irregular migration. They know about the services smugglers are offering. Many refugees are seeking information on what they can expect abroad and to what extent their friends and family members there have prepared the ground for them. Several refugees have applied for legal migration. They complain that they are not frequently updated on the progress of their cases, which often keep pending for years.

Few Sudanese men appear to contemplate migration. They rather plan to improve their living standards at home. They heard about many who migrated and have now a high level of income, but they do not see a legal option for migration. Engaging smugglers is perceived as risky.

“I tried many times to go outside through smugglers. I came back from Libya from this experience. I will never try again”.

Host respondent, Gedarif

Women of both groups appear ill-inclined to consider on-migration and, if anything, are dreaming of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states.

#### IV. How are the needs on the ground being met

The following section examines RDPP activities in Eastern Sudan following the evaluation criteria of relevance, coordination, sustainability, adaptiveness and capacity. Given that the Italian Development Corporation’s WASH activities and RVO’s agribusiness strengthening have not yet commenced, it focuses primarily on the GIZ livelihoods component.

As of March 2018, a Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) reported GIZ’s intervention outputs:

- 50 people benefit from professional trainings (TVET) and / or skills development.
- 11 staff members from local authorities and basic service providers benefit from capacity building to strengthen service delivery.

##### a. Relevance of programme activities

Livelihoods creation is relevant in the Sudanese context. At present refugees are not admitted to the publicly financed three-year apprenticeship training offered through the government of Sudan. NGOs offer courses for up to six months targeting specific groups and trades. Such courses can be certified by the Sudanese authorities. In an inclusive fashion, the GIZ project targets an equal number of refugee and host trainees, both male and female, partly in a centre and partly in private businesses. Trades were selected carefully based on their marketability, increasing relevance.

But the main factor determining the relevance for the local population is whether the training leads to employment or self-employment. The opportunities for graduates to use the newly acquired skills in the camps are limited. In the project proposal GIZ states that it will closely cooperate with and support the Commissioner for Refugees (CoR) and the Department of Labour to facilitate the issuance of special work and travel permits for refugees to participate in project activities. Both of these agencies however are bound by national policies, which does not allow refugees to leave the camps and work outside the camp without permission. This policy is set by the president of Sudan at the federal level.

To some extent the refugees have solved this problem. Since 2008, some 143,000 refugees disappeared after their registration. Many if not most Eritrean refugees in Um Gargour Camp, have acquired Sudanese IDs illegally, giving them freedom to travel.

They continue to live in Um Gargour Camp, most due to the cheaper housing and access to work in agriculture. Training some of the refugee Eritrean youth could lead to migration to Gedarif City for work.<sup>5</sup>

At a more micro level, we registered doubts about the relevance of some skills training through short courses for women, for instance those focusing on handicrafts and leather products. Informants felt that there was no local market for these products, and that travel to marketplaces was not socially acceptable.

It is too soon to evaluate the business development activities which had not yet started in the summer of 2019. Half of the trainees will be from refugee camps. Some products included in the planning can be sold in the camp (like beds), but raw material will have to be transported to the camp, adding costs. It is not yet clear how feasible different types of businesses will be in the camps.

In order to ascertain the needs of respondents, the survey tool administered for this baseline study contained questions directly pertaining to the question of relevance. The following table lays out the different types of assistance received by respondents (including but not limited to RDPP), their subjective assessment of the quality of assistance and professed need in terms of (further) aid in that domain. Food assistance remains highly relevant particularly for refugees, as does cash and business grants. TVET is generally judged positively.

**Table 2 - Are the services offered in Wad Sharifey in line with the needs of the beneficiaries?**

		Hosts	Refugees
food in kind assistance	% received	2%	15%
	% happy with	-	60%
	% requesting	27%	52%
non-food in kind assistance	% received	1%	29%
	% happy with	-	54%
	% requesting	13%	23%
cash	% received	4%	2%
	% happy with	-	-
	% requesting	61%	73%
supplementary for pregnant women / children	% received	12%	33%
	% happy with	70%	68%
	% requesting	9%	14%
business grants	% received	1%	2%
	% happy with	-	-
	% requesting	55%	42%
vsia	% received	2%	5%
	% happy with	-	50%
	% requesting	6%	6%
tvvet	% received	4%	18%
	% happy with	84%	67%
	% requesting	16%	13%
legal	% received	0%	2%
	% happy with	-	43%
	% requesting	2%	3%
agricultural inputs	% received	0%	0%
	% happy with	-	-
	% requesting	0%	0%

<sup>5</sup> The situation is different for Ethiopian refugees who usually do not have Sudanese IDs. When refugees work in Gedarif City without proper documents they are frequently arrested by police, who confiscate their equipment and return it in exchange for cash payments only.

## b. Adaptiveness of programme structures

Adaptiveness will be crucial given the dramatic changes in the political environment since April 2019. GIZ, the only implementing partner who started activities, has shown some degree of adaptiveness to unforeseen circumstances. This is evidenced, for instance, by an adjustment of training schedules: the training courses are intended to last one-year periods. Partly because of the delay in the re-construction of the vocational training centre and because of existing gaps of skilled labour in certain areas, four-month courses are developed and held as well. In the second half of 2018 these courses took place in Kassala and Gedarif States for both refugees and host communities.

In an acknowledgement of the insufficiency of output indicators, GIZ has set up monitoring and evaluation tools in the hope of being able to adapt in light not of “number of students trained” or “number of workshops given” but indeed employment results. To this end, the organisation plans to conduct tracer studies to evaluate the success rate of graduates in the labour market.

## c. Coordination

Coordination is crucial and challenging given the number of national stakeholders involved. There is no unified system for TVET in Sudan. Instead, the vocational education is governed by Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (SCVTA) which falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour at national level. The SCVTA is responsible for the development of curricula, the certification of training courses, the admission of students, and for examinations.

In Kassala, the vocational training centre (VTC) reports directly to the State Minister of Finance, whereas in Gedarif vocational training is under the responsibility of the Department of Labour and Vocational Training in the State Ministry of Finance.

At the State level there are Councils for Vocational Training, supervised by the Ministry of Finance, which have an advisory role to the Ministry of Finance and other actors involved in delivering Vocational Training services. The Director General of the Vocational Training Centre of Gedarif, who is administrative under the Ministry of Finance, is appointed as Secretary General to the council. This qualifies as a conflict of interest.

*A lack of coordination with the national authorities can have dire consequences: The Transitional Solutions Initiative, a programme in East Sudan implemented by UNHCR and UNDP in 2013-2014, was geared towards integrating long term refugees into the local communities by providing them the skills and services to be self-sustaining. Sudanese authorities (under Bashir at that time) stopped this programme over concerns that it had been devised without the input of the local authorities.*

GIZ has a project Advisory Board composed of the MoF, DoL, CoR, the Women Union and representatives of craftsmen. Board members communicate with each other through emails and a WhatsApp group. GIZ also attends monthly coordination meetings with other International Organisations working in Eastern Sudan (UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP). These coordination meetings are taking place in Kassala as their regional offices are based there. The focus in these meetings is on Eastern Sudan as a whole.

The effectiveness of the governance structure and coordination between GIZ and state actors depends on the commitment of all parties.

Early signs are not encouraging: when GIZ visited the vocational training centre built earlier by the Transformative Solution Initiative (TSI), later frozen by NISS in 2013, it decided to reconstruct the premises. These efforts were hampered by lack of support from the Ministry of Finance. Delays have affected the price of materials and led to issues with the construction company.

Coordination with other international organizations under RDPP has been sporadic while their activities were on hold, or in the planning stages. While an assessment was conducted to ensure there would not be an overlap between GIZ activities and those of a fellow RDPP project by the Italian Cooperation for Development (AICS), communication since has been infrequent.

#### d. Capacity building and local ownership

GIZ plans to develop the capacity of trainers and of the administrative staff in the school, who are civil servants from the MoF. Areas for improvement include the definition of teaching plans and processes (e.g. class registers, documenting absences etc.), as well as the use of monitoring and evaluation tools and tracer studies. Sixteen technical teachers are nominated to be trained in four selected trades.

The degree of success will depend on national counterpart cooperation, but also on attitudes within the international community:

“I am from Gedarif and I am well familiar with the Ministry of Finance. They only want money. They resisted the idea of RDPP running the VTC – they wanted to implement it by themselves”.

Key informant

More broadly, RDPP actors have committed themselves to strengthening the capacity of the State Vocational Training Council to map needs for skilled labour and job opportunities in a more systematic way. GIZ plans to do this by involving them in the assessment of labour markets, the development of curricula, and by connecting them to the private sector.

Other RDPP partners also have integrated considerations of sustainability. UNIDO aims to contribute to capacity building for vocational training centres in partnership with the Khartoum State Ministry and the Supreme Council for Vocational Training.

#### e. Sustainability and Effectiveness

The Vocational Training Center set up by GIZ will receive support from the MoF in covering expenses for electricity and water, in addition to administrative expenses and the cost of raw materials. The role of GIZ will focus on the reconstruction of the premises, the development of curricula and training. This responsibility sharing can contribute to the financial sustainability of the project. Good governance, transparency, accountability, and adequate checks and balances will be crucial ingredients to long-term outcomes. Ideally, the VTC might be a ‘role model’ for others and lead to sustainability of vocational training services in the region more broadly. If graduates manage to find employment or set up a small business or workshop, this also might contribute to a sustainable improvement of their living conditions.

Only a minority of Sudanese officials understand the RDPP project as a holistic intervention. Most of the line ministries and counterparts understand it as an isolated activity. Change of policy and create greater awareness of the benefits of integration are not goals of the GIZ project.

Given this context it is unlikely that the GIZ project is going to make a significant contribution to strengthening the integration of refugees into the host community, apart from increased migration of graduated Eritrean refugees with Sudanese IDs from the camps to the cities, particularly in Gedarif State.

## V. Conclusion and Recommendations: Ways forward to 2020

If Ethiopia's new refugee law is implemented, Sudan will be the only RDPP country that continues to maintain an explicit encampment policy. This policy will continue to lead to legal obstacles that constrain programming. As long as these policies are in place, RDPP activities in Sudan will only have limited impact on the lives of both refugee and host communities. While the protracted nature of the refugee context in north eastern Sudan has meant that a certain level of informal social and economic integration has occurred, in particular for Eritrean refugees, this does not translate into long term economic growth.

Relevance and adaptiveness of programming has been limited. Significant delays in implementation, and concerns about the relevance of livelihoods training in a context where sustainable economic perspectives are limited, have been barriers to implementation. Basic humanitarian needs, such as food, water, and health have not been met; activities meant to target these needs had not yet started at the time of the baseline. Targeting these needs is crucial, as trainings are unlikely to lead to decent long-term work and inadequately met basic needs form an obstacle to achieving self-reliance.

In addition, the governance context in Sudan is highly disjointed and challenging. Multiple national and local government stakeholders are involved in a variety of activities, and coordination between these actors is often ineffective. Relationships with the authorities is strained and navigating the complexities of the Sudanese security infrastructure has been as source of frustration, confusions, and delays. Cases have existed where a programme was significantly pushed back or shut down because the appropriate local authorities were not consulted.

Finding a means to effectively identify, address, and include these actors is crucial to the effectiveness and sustainability of programming. At the time of baseline data collection there were no active or effective coordination structures that addressed these challenges.

The findings provide a snapshot of the situation of RDPP Sudan in the spring of 2018, with a focus on activities taking place in Kassala and Gedarif. Different actors have different roles to play in building capacity and effectively implementing RDPP; the following recommendations provide actionable points for each to address weaknesses that have been highlighted and build upon the strengths of the project.

## Structural recommendations for implementing partners

NEED OR CHALLENGE	RECOMMENDATION
<b>Lack of regular communication not only with Government counterparts but also with RDPP partners.</b>	<b>Strengthen communications:</b> We argued over the course of the report that the stakeholder landscape at the national level is both convoluted and difficult to navigate. A great deal of efforts is required to reach out to government actors, obtain access, permits, financing etc. The new government landscape, once settled, will call for a ‘fresh start’ in terms of outreach, and this might represent an opportunity to improve coordination.  It should not be as difficult for the RDPP partners themselves to keep each other apprised – constant communication between the closely related GIZ and AICS components for instance could result in shared strategies and lessons learned, for the benefit of actors following in the footsteps in others.
<b>IPs, donors and stakeholders had a different understanding of what the overall impact-level objectives of the programme are.</b>	<b>Agree on a common monitoring framework:</b> The activities falling under RDPP in Eastern Sudan are vast, and each has its own results framework. At the same time, they all fall under a common RDPP agenda / theory of change which should ultimately guide efforts. A common monitoring framework should reflect synergies and the interlinked nature of the desired outcomes. A common gauge of ‘success’ beyond outputs can improve coordination and accountability. The outcome metric proposed in this report may serve as a starting point for further reflection in this regard.

## Activity specific recommendations for implementing partners

NEED OR CHALLENGE	RECOMMENDATION
<b>Significant delays in most activities.</b>	<b>Identify sources of delays:</b> Given the crucial importance of the WASH and Health component’s contribution to the overall RDPP outcomes (ranging from livelihoods to social cohesion), it is imperative that activities commence promptly. Organisational learning, however, should also be drawn from a case study on the reasons progress has been slow, allowing partners and future initiatives to benefit from lessons learned. Donor pressure might be needed to remove certain obstacles at different administrative echelons.
<b>It is unclear where trained individuals might head with their newly gained skills</b>	For TVET activities, start <b>tracer studies now rather than later:</b> Given the general bleak outlook of the economy, it is of note that a number of households who could search for opportunities outside of camp setting choose to remain. This is the case both for hosts and for certain refugees who have been offered alternative arrangements. At the same time, qualitative research revealed that a number of trades taught would be more useful in a different context - or at least with access to markets further afield. It will be crucial to understand where these trades take beneficiaries, with an eye to differentiating between Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees, as well as vulnerable hosts. Given the particular circumstances faced by the women of these different groups, the impact of gender on outcomes must be closely monitored.

## Structural recommendations for RDPP Steering Committee and Donors

NEED OR CHALLENGE	RECOMMENDATION
<b>The relationship with previous Government stakeholders was strained, and there is no visibility on the future Government setup.</b>	<b>Be sensitive in light of ongoing upheaval:</b> Efforts to provide eastern Sudan’s refugees with protection, assistance and solutions rely on a limited number and narrow range of partners, most of them national entities and some of which bring only a modest capacity to their operational activities. More than in other contexts studied for this project, RDPP partners did not appear to enjoy a particularly comfortable relationship with the central authorities, and displayed difficulties in navigating the complex security regime. Building a working relationship with national authorities post-coup will require careful joint international advocacy and dialogue.
<b>Actions are perceived as disconnected and not addressing the underlying issues.</b>	<b>Take a long-term view.</b> Livelihoods, self-reliance and local integration strategy cannot be expected to be effective unless eastern Sudan is able to benefit from a robust process of economic growth and infrastructural expansion. Given the high levels of poverty and low levels of development in eastern Sudan, humanitarian activities must remain a priority, while being linked to long-term aid and investment strategies that are designed to attract robust growth to this neglected part of the country.
<b>No long-term solutions can be fathomed without an end of the encampment strategy.</b>	<b>Advocate.</b> Not pushed to return but not offered a path to naturalisation, the Eritreans have been confronted with legal obstacles that prevent them from owning land and property. This places constraints on their freedom of movement and makes it difficult for them to enter the formal labour market. Donors should advocate on behalf of refugee rights and continue to promote sustainable refugee livelihoods with the ultimate goal of enabling the refugees to live without assistance. As those objectives are achieved, the camps should be decommissioned and integrated into national service-delivery structures.



## Annex 1: WAY FORWARD: USING AN RDPP OUTCOME METRIC TO GAUGE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAMMING

### ✓ Why an outcome metric?

In order to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of RDPP programming, stakeholders in the field, donors and evaluators should agree on the effects they would expect to see. Focusing only on variables programming would expect to be able to influence, scores can be attributed to individual respondents both along the relevant dimensions and overall. These scores can immediately be used to point to gaps between hosts and refugees and identify the most vulnerable respondents in categories of interest. At the time of the endline, to the extent that the same respondents are identified and re-interviewed, the evolution in the relevant dimensions can be assessed and linked to programming efforts, thus informing implementing partners, donors and the wider community of knowledge.

### ✓ Which dimensions / quantitative indicators are relevant in the case of the camp and surroundings?

The indicators should focus on domains directly relevant to RDPP activities in the field. In Eastern Sudan, these (mainly future) activities focus on WASH, livelihoods, and protection. Based on these broad categories, the following indicators were selected to form part of the location specific RDPP outcome metric:

**Table 3 - Eastern Sudan-specific RDPP outcome indicators**

<b>Water and sanitation</b>	Access to an improved water source
	Enough water for agricultural production
	Access to some kind of toilet facility
	Garbage-free environment
<b>Livelihoods</b>	Working-age individuals in paid work or self-employed
	Individuals working in an integrated setting
	Working individuals with a formal contract
	Individuals who have access to TVET to foster their skills
	Households which have access to credit
	Households which have income redundancy (more than one earner)
	Respondents who find their economic situation (very) comfortable
<b>Protection</b>	Households who feel safe in their communities
	Respondents who do not feel women are at risk in their communities
	Respondents who feel they can turn to the local authorities in case of need
	Respondents who successfully sought out protection in case of need


### ✓ How is the metric calculated?

For each thematic / programmatic domain, a number of binary (true / false) indicators was assembled representing the status of each respondent within the domain. Given the responses to these indicators of all host and refugee respondents in our sample, a multiple correspondence analysis<sup>6</sup> was used to determine a set of weights that would maximise the variance of the weighted sum of these variables among the sample. Such empirical indices are often used in the absence of an a priori set of weights based on intimate knowledge of the underlying populations with respect to the themes at hand. These weights were then used to create a thematic index which was then used to compute a score for each respondent household in each dimension.

<sup>6</sup> Although for binary variables, multiple correspondence analysis is functionally equivalent to principal components analysis, the former is a more appropriate term due to the lack of scalarity in the variables.

✓ **What are the preliminary insights?**


Figure 11 - Average scores of host and refugee respondents



The overall assessment of average scores between host and refugee respondents points to a gap particularly in the domain of WASH. Closing this gap, and raising the scores towards one, will be one of the goals of RDPP programming in the years to come.

The livelihoods scores are not very far apart – as established earlier in this chapter, there is some degree of labour market integration, albeit often illegally and at a low level of resilience.

Figure 12 - Livelihoods scores and TVET received



Analysing mean livelihoods scores against having benefited from TVET, we see that hosts having had TVET training do not score higher, but refugees do. It is not possible to ascertain whether this is due to success of programming (aid raises livelihoods scores) or inefficient targeting (those most in need are not necessarily those selected as beneficiaries) - further light will be shed at the link between economic well-being and programming at the endline stage.

✓ **What changes would we expect to see at the time of the endline?**

If targeting is effective, one would expect the lowest quartile of respondents to have improved their scores considerably. The domains where respondents score the lowest should be prioritised.

In the case of Eastern Sudan, these are the livelihoods domains, with a focus on refugee populations. In line with the goals of the integrated approach, gaps between hosts and refugees should be minimised. Overall, the population should be lifted towards the goal of a ‘perfect score’. This is by no means an ideal score but simply represents minimum standards being met in the context of this study and in the domains relevant to programming efforts. WASH scores should be raised thanks to the Italian Corporation’s component commencing.

## Annex 2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

In what follows, we present the 2018 baseline situation of RDPP-related activities in Eastern Sudan. The region, and the survey location (Wad Sharifey in Kassala), were selected in consultation with RDPP stakeholders active in Sudan as the best option because of programming, accessibility and permits / authorisations reasons. Unlike in other country contexts, the quantitative fieldwork took place in a location separate from that of the qualitative case studies. Given the fact that many of the RDPP activities in Sudan have faced significant delays, the case study of GIZ TVET activities was carried out in Um Gargour camp, the only open refugee camp in Gedarif State. Furthermore, given that, like Wad Sharifey, this camp is mainly inhabited by Eritrean Muslims, in order to also reflect the voices of Ethiopian refugees, a number of qualitative consultations were carried out in the proximity of the nearby (closed, and under authority of the National Intelligence Security Service) camp of Um Golgha. **While the results presented here constitute a broad picture of RDPP in Eastern Sudan as of Spring 2018, they cannot be easily extrapolated to (ongoing and future) RDPP activities in more urban contexts, such as the capital, Khartoum.**

Challenges encountered during the fieldwork included the following:

The international Team Leader focused on the Sudan chapter was unable to obtain a visa to visit Sudan in person, in spite of a timely application and frequent follow-up. A number of planned activities, including the organisational capacity assessment of vocational training centres and in-person interviews with certain stakeholders (EU delegation in Khartoum, Netherlands Embassy, UNHCR, and certain local stakeholders) could not be carried out in the timeframe we had planned.

For the qualitative research in Gedarif State, villagers living close to the camps could not be assembled to take part in focus group discussions due to weather conditions and impassable roads. Instead, host focus groups were interviewed in nearby Gedarif city. This impacts qualitative findings on livelihoods and social cohesion: the hosts partaking in these focus group discussions may feel less strongly about competition regarding natural resources near the camps, but more strongly about the refugees' impact on the local labour market.

For the quantitative research, sampling considerations extended to the number of Sudanese living in, and benefiting from the services of, Wad Sharifey camp,<sup>7</sup> as well as to the number of refugees fully integrated as part of the host community. This means that the sampling plan could not simply be designed based on location. The team investigated the possibility of relying on official documentation to ascertain refugee status but were told during informal consultations that such documents could easily be obtained by non-refugees and were not in and of themselves reliable indicators. We decided to follow the council of camp committee supervisors in the identification of refugees, while in the host communities we decided that individuals who had been living as part of the host community for decades could for all intents and purposes be considered as such.

A further important sampling consideration was the fact that the economic situation of those living near the camp's administrative area was significantly better compared to those living further afield, with advantages ranging from electricity provision to quality of dwelling building materials. The fieldwork zones were reviewed in order to capture that sub-group, while ensuring it not be overrepresented in the final sample.

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
<sup>7</sup> Often IDPs, often allegedly involved with smuggling networks into the camp.



**Photo 10** - View from enumerator vehicle during unexpected sandstorm - no fieldwork could take place that day.

Operational challenges included weather and fuel shortages: In mid-April, temperatures in Kassala exceed 40 degrees Celsius. Operational imperatives were gathering data prior to the commencement of the rainy season, which makes the road from Kassala to the Shagarab camps inaccessible, and prior to Ramadan which (given the heat) would have resulted in delays beyond those already experienced due to severe fuel shortages<sup>8</sup>. Violent sand storms (Haboob) interrupted data collection on two occasions, confining enumerators to their vehicles for the better part of the day.

Research permits needed to be obtained from the local Commission of Refugees (CoR) representative, along with camp entry permits for each day of fieldwork. Despite these permits having been granted, some interference was faced by Wad Sharifey's local committee supervisors in the early part of the fieldwork.



**Photos 11 and 12** - Map of Wad Sharifey, households surveyed

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<sup>8</sup> The repercussions of fuel shortage were twofold: electricity was highly unstable, as generators were not usually powered, making it difficult to charge the devices for data collection; time was lost waiting at gas stations and transport to the enumeration areas was challenging. These challenges were mitigated through the use of power banks and locomotion on foot or via donkey carts. They inevitably did lead to delays.