



External evaluation of the INGO Safety Advisory Office (ISAO)



Final Report

Fall 2013

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

| | |
|--------------|---|
| ADRA | Adventist Development and Relief Agency |
| AQAP | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula |
| DRC | Danish Refugee Council |
| ECHO | European Commission Humanitarian Office |
| DFID | Department for International Development (United Kingdom) |
| DRC | Danish Refugee Council |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organisation |
| INGOF | INGO Forum |
| ISAO | INGO Safety Advisory Office Attorney General's Office |
| MoI | Ministry of Interior |
| MoPIC | Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation |
| MSF | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| NDC | National Dialogue Conference |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| UNDSS | United Nations Department of Safety and Security |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WFP | United Nations World Food Programme |

I. Introduction: objectives, methods, and background

“Security / Is mortals' chiefest enemy.”
William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*

“Everything is relative”
Albert Einstein

Evaluation objectives

The INGO Safety Advisory Office (ISAO) was established in the Spring of 2011 following a recognition by the INGO Forum of the need for a collaborative security initiative to provide information on the safety and security context to INGOs operating in the country. ISAO is fully funded by the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and is hosted by CARE Yemen. ISAO's main office is in the capital Sana'a with a sub-office recently opened in Aden to cater for the increasing number of INGOs operating across the southern region. ISAO currently has 53 international NGO members and observers. Its mandate limits it to serve only the INGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and that are registered in their country of origin.

Today, ISAO provides a number of services to INGOs in line with other collaborative security initiatives (like GANSO or ANSO) and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS): SMS Alerts, Email Alerts and Advisories, Daily news of relevance to INGOs, Twice-monthly contextual reports, Twice-monthly Country Briefs, Road, city and district briefs and assessments, Training (Guards, Drivers, Security Awareness and New Arrivals), Bi-lateral briefings, Advice on contingency planning and security plans, Commissioned reports including village level tribal mapping involving the collaboration of INGOs.

The objective of the Project evaluation for ISAO is to provide an external evaluation and present findings that illustrate the extent to which the INGO Safety Advisory Office has achieved its planned objectives and related results. The desk review, qualitative and quantitative elements assessed the broad categories of (1) Beneficiary (INGO) satisfaction (2) ISAO's institutional architecture (3) How (or if) ISAO contributes to improved security management within INGOs. Finally, a set of recommendations based on the above three points is provided in the last section of the present document.

Samuel Hall. has undertaken this important mission in Yemen for three main reasons:

1. **Timeliness.** The evaluation intervenes at a time of increasing political and security uncertainty in Yemen,
2. **Redefinition of NGO roles in conflict and post-conflict settings.** The work of NGOs is evolving across conflict and post-conflict settings – with a re-assessment of NGO access, perceptions and security,
3. **Expansion to the Near East, East Africa and the Horn of Africa.** Samuel Hall is expanding its research activities to analyse economic, social and political developments that impact the work of NGOs, United Nations agencies, and more broadly, the lives of vulnerable populations

Methods

The review was conducted in Sana'a and Aden, Yemen, from July 10 29 to July 20, 2013. It included a mixed methodology based on both qualitative and quantitative research. As shown in the graph below, the research activities were implemented through four major tasks: face-to-face interviews, an online survey, focus group discussions, as well as participatory observations.

Desk review of the existing literature (*context, ISAO, and other stakeholders*)

A desk-based review of all the existing secondary literature was first conducted in order to better narrow down the scope of work and identify potential informational gaps. Then, the review team conducted a large review of all relevant project documentation (official indicators, national strategies, ISAO internal documentation), gathering and collating information on a selected number of national and international stakeholders. It should be noted that ISAO kindly granted access to its online database of internal reports as well as all the available information on social, political, religious or security-related issues in Yemen. This desk review included the review and assessment of official reports, available documentary sources and the history and trends of indicators used in programming efforts by different stakeholders (especially UNDSS, GIZ). Due to the significant time, security, and logistical constraints, we targeted the following areas: Aden and Sana'a through face-to-face collective and individual interviews.

Key informant interviews at both national and provincial levels

Prior to the online quantitative survey, representatives from international and/or local organizations were interviewed in both Sana'a and Aden. Respondents were selected on the basis of their influence at the national level, their presence locally and their ability to provide quality and reliable information – starting with ISAO representatives, as well as other relevant programmes, ISAO beneficiaries, ISAO observers (MSF, ICRC), UNDSS and UN agencies, Embassy representatives with an insight into the social, political and security dynamics. Meetings with ISAO's donor agency (ECHO) and ISAO's grant holder (CARE) were also conducted during the course of the field visit in Sana'a. The interviews followed an in-depth interview methodology, with open-ended questions, lasting on average 1 hour per respondent. A special questionnaire was built for each representative – depending on the area of specialization. A full list of key informant interviews and stakeholder contacts is included as an annex to the present report. A total of 32 Key Informant Interviews (or KIIs), including 27 in Sana'a and 5 in Aden, were conducted.

Focus Group Discussions

The Review Team hosted a series of focus groups discussions (FGDs) with the ISAO staff as well as ISAO beneficiaries from international NGOs to probe the feelings of a group of individuals with different responsibilities and functions (Country Director, Program Officer, Field Officer, Security Officer, etc.). Specific guidelines were developed for group interviews with 3 to 5 respondents. A total of 3 Focus Group sessions were then led by a moderator and note-taker, and a total of 11 individuals were surveyed using this method. The main added value of these three focus group discussions were (1) to compare and contrast information received, at a later stage, through quantitative interviews, (2) to move beyond individual perspective and obtain wider organisation-level perspectives of specific issues, and (3) identify trade-offs and contradictions between participants either on the security situation or on the perception of ISAO's role and services, and open a constructive debate on these topics.

The project team was responsible for following ethical and cultural considerations, which included but not limited to obtaining informed consent from the participants to the qualitative phase (and their respective organisations).

Quantitative fieldwork – online survey of 75 ISAO individual beneficiaries

The quantitative component of the survey helped the review team identify general and common perception trends among ISAO beneficiaries. It privileged questionnaire-based interviews conducted via email after completion of the fieldwork phase in Yemen. This quantitative phase thus benefitted from the first qualitative findings of the interviews held in Sana'a and Aden, which allowed the review team to test some work hypotheses and fine tune preliminary analyses. The survey was composed of 65 questions and included questions aimed to capture the following aspects:

- (i) Perception and feedback from beneficiaries,
- (ii) Key challenges and strengths of ISAO,
- (iii) Comparison with other similar service providers (benchmark with UNDSS, GIZ, Safer Yemen, etc.),
- (iv) Beneficiary needs assessment,
- (v) Improvements, suggestions, and areas of opportunity.

The survey was uploaded on the web and sent to recipients of the ISAO NGO members list. Several reminders encouraged the recipients to fill in the questionnaire. While the survey was online for 20 days, 75 respondents filled the survey.

Last, it should be noted that the review team compared some of the findings of the quantitative survey with the first online survey conducted in 2012¹; however, we chose not to systematically draw a comparison between the two surveys, as the sample size of the first survey was only indicative (40 respondents).

Limitations and Constraints

If the use of an online survey was an attempt to better quantify INGOs' perception of ISAO's strengths and challenges, it is important to bear in mind that such a perception-based research only draws a subjective picture of ISAO's services and operational environment.

Moreover, any type of online survey will only reach a limited subset of the potential targeted respondents. In particular, online surveys are voluntary, with responses only from customers who *choose* to participate for subjective and/or professional motives.²

¹ J. Renouf and A. Carle, *External evaluation of the INGOF Safety Advisory Office*, Other Solutions Consulting, 2012.

² J.R. Evans and A. Mathur, "The value of online surveys", *Internet Research* Vol. 15 No. 2, 2005 pp. 195-219, New York, USA

In the Yemeni context, another commonly experienced problem with web surveys stems from the time necessary to download pages, which can seriously hamper respondents' capacity and willingness to answer. Given these limitations, the quantitative online survey was only used in the current review as a complement to the qualitative interviews conducted with ISAO's beneficiaries and partners.

Last, it is worth noting that the quantitative findings of the "ISAO customer satisfaction survey" shall not be considered in absolute terms, as satisfaction rates are generally quite high on such surveys; it is probably better to use longitudinal comparisons to identify trends and dynamics in respondents' answers. At a later stage, we thus strongly recommend that ISAO use the online questionnaire as a recurring monitoring tool (every six months) to quantify INGOs' perceptions of ISAO's services and get a detailed picture of INGOs' understanding of the security context.

Political Context

✓ Endemic insecurity and criminality

Under an exit agreement brokered by the United Nations Security Council, the United States, European Union member states, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), President Ali Abdullah Saleh left office in February 2012, following mass protests. The designated two-year transition president, Saleh's deputy, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, had to face multiple challenges: 1) bring security forces and militias under civilian command, 2) pass a transitional justice law, 3) draft a new constitution, 4) reform the electoral and judicial systems, and 5) hold general elections in February 2014.

However, the Yemeni Government has little effective control over the vast majority of its territory. The main political challenges that the state faces are:

- **Northern sectarianism:** On-going clashes between Salafi fighters and Al-Huthi rebels in the far North (Sa'da);
- **Southern separatism:** Rising separatist sentiment in the South from a coalition of autonomist or secessionist groups;
- **Terrorism:** A growing insurgency of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants, and their local affiliate (Ansar al-Sharia), throughout large portions of the country; and
- **Counter-terrorism:** Between January and mid-August 2013, the US has launched 21 airstrikes in Yemen, the vast majority from drones, according to the Long War Journal³.
- **Salehism:** Last, political transition measures are still resisted by loyalists of former President Saleh, who remains in Yemen as head of the General People's Congress.

Many symptoms of Yemen's fragility are thus intrinsically connected to weak governance. In this regard, the United Nations Development Project writes that *"Overlaying a modern state upon Yemen's traditional governance system has proved difficult, and both state formation and nation building remain works-in-progress. Meanwhile, to ensure its survival, the government has created informal political alliances with traditional shaiks, religious leaders, and powerful interest groups through intensive*

³ <http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php>. Should that trend hold, it would mean there would be more annual US drone strikes in Yemen than in Pakistan, the home of Al-Qaida's central leadership, for the first time since 2001.

patronage networks outside the formal state structures – which has given rise to the so-called ‘parallel state’⁴. In other words, the state lacks the institutional capacity and political legitimacy “to exercise significant positive change in the lives of its citizens: these contribute directly to both crime and conflict”⁵.

✓ **Multiple symptoms of a chronic humanitarian situation**

In May 2013, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, said the country was at a crossroad that could either lead to increased stability or plunge the country back into conflict: *“there will be no political transition if we don’t deal with the humanitarian situation”*. The country faces a growing humanitarian crisis, with more than 10 million people — almost half the country’s population — in need of humanitarian assistance to access food, healthcare, safe water and sanitation, according to WFP; child malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world with close to half of Yemen’s children under five years — two million children — stunted and one million acutely malnourished.

Moreover, the situation of refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons has become a major humanitarian issue Yemen — traditionally known as a transitory and receiving country for migrants from the Horn of Africa. An unprecedented number of Somali and Ethiopian migrants continue to come to Yemen in search of safety or economic opportunities in Yemen, or on their way further afield. If 2012 brought the largest recorded influx to Yemen (with 107,500 persons), 2013 may surpass any previous records: *“in the first three months of 2013 alone, more than 25,000 Ethiopians travelled to Yemen by sea, either directly from Ethiopia or via Djibouti”⁶*. Likewise, in the recent approbation of the National IDP Policy that of instability in Yemen highlighted that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were more vulnerable to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

✓ **Political transition: the National Dialogue Conference**

In such an uncertain political and humanitarian context, National Dialogue Conference (NDC) proceedings (originally planned to end on September 2013 but still ongoing in October 2013 for additional discussions) were supposed to garner and address grievances of all the warring parties — including and the Southern Movement, a coalition of autonomist or secessionist Southern groups. United Nations Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, briefed the United Nations Security Council on the situation, stressing Yemen currently being at a critical turning point and reporting that the NDC had already achieved nine-tenth of progress. The NDC is meant to feed into a constitution-making process and pave the way for the February 2014 general elections. According to the UN, preparations for the electoral process are underway, including steps to create a new biometric voter registry, with registration due to begin in September; however, should the National Dialogue be unable to find a consensual settlement to the ‘Southern question’, the social and political situation would probably become extremely volatile — if not untenable.

⁴ United Nations Development Project, 2010 *Re-thinking Approaches to Local Governance Programming in Conflict-Affected Countries in the Arab Region: An Exploratory Study (Draft)*. Cairo: Regional Bureau of Arab States, UNDP.

⁵ Lewis, A 2013 “Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism”. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2(1): 13, pp. 1-22.

⁶ See E. Mooney, Flight, fragility and furthering stability in Yemen, *Forced Migration Review*, May 2013.

Picture 1: Children in the Old City (Sana'a)



II. Key Findings

Respondent Profile

The quantitative data covers 75 respondents including one third of country directors, about half of program staff (including management, logistics, admin and other program staff), and 20 per cent of security staff of ISAO beneficiary organizations.

1. The positive response rate –

75 responses for 53 NGO beneficiaries of ISAO services in Yemen – shows that all ISAO beneficiaries have been covered by this assessment, with at least 1 respondent per beneficiary but often more. Out of approximately 200 contacts to whom this survey was sent, over one third (about 35 per cent) responded, hence providing a representative sample of opinions and perceptions of ISAO’s work.

Table 1. Quantitative survey breakdown per respondent type (2013 and 2012)

| | 2013 | | 2012 | |
|-------------------------------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|
| | Count | Percentage | Count | Percentage |
| Country Director / Head of Mission | 24 | 32% | 17 | 39% |
| Program related staff | 36 | 48% | 14 | 32% |
| ✓ Other Program | 15 | 20% | - | - |
| ✓ Other Management | 13 | 17% | - | - |
| ✓ Other Logistics | 5 | 7% | - | - |
| ✓ Other Admin | 3 | 4% | - | - |
| Security Manager / Security Officer | 15 | 20% | 13 | 29% |
| Total Number of Respondents | 75 | 100% | 44 | 100% |

2. Growing rate of Yemeni respondents –

Whereas one third of respondents in 2012 were Yemeni counterparts, in our 2013 survey about half of the respondent pool is Yemeni. This is a testament to the efforts made by ISAO to be more nationally representative and inclusive – with an outreach between 2012 and 2013 that has focused on targeting national staff and national counterparts.

Table 2. Respondent breakdown by gender and nationality (2013 and 2012)


| Online Survey Respondents | 2013 | | 2012 | |
|---------------------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|
| | Count | Percentage | Count | Percentage |
| Male | 51 | 69% | 33 | 73% |
| Female | 23 | 31% | 12 | 27% |
| Total Respondents | 74 | 100% | 45 | 100% |
| Yemeni | 35 | 47% | 13 | 32,5% |
| Foreigner | 40 | 53% | 27 | 67,5% |
| Total Respondents | 75 | 100% | 40 | 100% |

“ISAO highly encourages INGOs to examine their current security management structures, adopt prudent measures to mitigate against the threats in Sana’a but also at the sub-national level, which should not only include expat staff but the entirety of the organisation”.
- ISAO Briefing June 2013

3. Wide geographic coverage –

Chart 2 illustrates the reach of ISAO’s coverage to Sana’a primarily (53 per cent) but surprisingly, not only: about half of the respondents mostly work in Aden and other locations in Yemen. This provides ISAO with the added benefit of not speaking in the voice of organizations’ head offices – mainly based in Sana’a – but to be representative of the field’s security concerns and challenges. This is both an achievement and a ‘threat’ for ISAO’s future – how to keep this geographic relevance in the face of growing insecurity in the country? This trend will have to be monitored through 2014 to assess the strength of the ties that link ISAO with field offices.

Graph 2: Where do you mostly work?



Hence, a first positive outcome and best practice that this research highlights is the effective outreach efforts by the ISAO team which have resulted in three important achievements in 2013:

- Proven beneficiary interest for and proven commitment to ISAO’s services (all NGOs responded to the survey call and requests for interviews, with often more than 1 staff per NGO),
- A greater voice for Yemeni counterparts, indicating a more nationally inclusive process and consultative process resulting from ISAO management’s efforts in 2012/2013. The comparison with 2012, used here as a baseline, provides an indication of these positive trends, and
- The strong geographic coverage in Sana’a – not surprisingly given that the city is home to most offices, whether ISAO’s or beneficiaries’ – and almost equally in the field, split between Aden and other locations in Yemen. This will have to be measured again in 2014 to assess the sustainability of the geographic coverage and the strengths of ties that link ISAO with its beneficiaries, both at central/national and sub-national/field levels.

“All of us read what comes out of ISAO – otherwise you are a poor manager”.

- DRC Country Director, July 2013

Perceptions of risk

High perception of security risk: Beneficiaries interviewed in 2013 considered the security situation as concerning (72 per cent), mainly for their international staff (88 per cent). Concerns over kidnappings of foreign nationals prevail (carjacking first for 67 per cent of respondents, followed by criminal kidnapping and tribal kidnapping rated by half of respondents), along with the limited access it entails for internationals to field activities. The assessment of the security of national staff was less negative with one third of organizations expressing concern. It is important to note that safety issues ranked very low – under 5 per cent. Beneficiaries are focusing on the security environment and its risks, rather than any other safety hazards.

We will return to this in the recommendations and trade-off section of this report as these findings contain important recommendations for training activities to be led by ISAO for its beneficiaries – trainings that should not disregard the importance of both security *and* safety measures for beneficiary staff, foreigner or national alike.

Table 3. Perceptions of risk in Yemen

| Generally speaking, how do you rate the security situation in Yemen for organization like yours? | | | |
|--|--------------|---------------------|----------------|
| | Organization | International staff | National staff |
| Extremely concerning | 7% | 32% | 1% |
| Concerning | 65% | 56% | 32% |
| Average | 17% | 9% | 45% |
| Relatively Good | 11% | 1% | 12% |
| Not a problem at all | 0% | 1% | 9% |

Table 4. Perceptions of major security threats

| What are the 3 major security threats that are likely to happen to you and your organization today in Yemen? | | |
|--|-----|------|
| Carjacking | 50 | 67% |
| Criminal Kidnapping | 40 | 53% |
| Tribal Kidnapping | 36 | 48% |
| Car accident | 34 | 45% |
| Politically driven / Terrorist attack | 17 | 23% |
| Cross-fire | 17 | 23% |
| Demonstration / Riot | 16 | 21% |
| Armed Robbery | 7 | 9% |
| Physical Assault | 4 | 5% |
| Extortion | 3 | 4% |
| Domestic hazards | 2 | 3% |
| Other | 3 | 4% |
| Total | 229 | 100% |

Dealing with the kidnapping threat: In today’s context, kidnappings are probably the most relevant lens through which to assess INGOs’ perception of risk and security threat. According to ISAO’s Project Manager. *“The threat of kidnappings in Yemen, and especially in Sana’a, is considered as the primary threat for INGO international staff”*. Historically and traditionally, tribal kidnappings have been used to solve a dispute between two clans or families; more recently, economic predators have developed a proper kidnapping business, especially in the cities of Sana’a and Taizz (to a lesser extent). The table below clearly highlights the current increase in the number of attempted or actual kidnappings in Sana’a: 6 in 2012 and already 8 for the first seven months of 2013.

Table 5: Reported kidnappings or attempted kidnappings of international in Sana’a between January 2012 and July 2013 (monthly basis)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|
| 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 14 |
| 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | | | | | | | | | 13 |
| 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | | 3 | | | | 4 | 6 | | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | |
| | 1.12 | 2.12 | 3.12 | 4.12 | 5.12 | 6.12 | 7.12 | 8.12 | 9.12 | 10.12 | 11.12 | 12.12 | 1.13 | 2.13 | 3.13 | 4.13 | 5.13 | 6.13 | 7.13 | |

Source: ISAO data, 2012-2013

“You have two types of attitudes: either people who think that it cannot happen to them and do not take the threat seriously; or people who become paranoid and paralyzed by the risk. You have to adapt to both” (NRC, Security Officer, Aden). ISAO’s role is precisely to help INGOs take a step back in an environment that has become increasingly conducive to paranoia, rumours, and irrational decisions⁷. Taking kidnapping as an example, we have tried to show how risk is generally assessed and perceived by the INGOs ISAO is working with. The quotes below, extracted from the interviewees conducted with INGO representatives, favour the idea that most international aid and development workers, whilst realizing the existing threat associated with them being perceived as foreigners and a potential source of income, are too often unable to turn this into practical wisdom:

- **Worsening security context:** *“The situation has changed drastically in the last 3 years. Before 2011, more relax in terms of security (despite tribal kidnappings). In one year, I have seen a clear deterioration in the capital. So far, it has been mostly economic and kidnappers target individuals rather than organisations” (ECHO staff, Sana’a).*
- **Comfort zone:** *“The problem with Yemen is that you don’t see the risk. People who were here before (2009-2011) still have an image of Arabic schools in the Old City. Every month, there’s an attempt or a kidnapping. So there are these assumptions that nothing can happen to us. People are either in their comfort zone – a dangerous zone – or in a paranoid circle. Both are dangerous” (Oxfam staff, Sana’a).*
- **Security restrictions:** *“Kidnappings, especially in Sana’a have sharply increased. It has become a real and big business. Our movements are more and more restricted. We apply curfews, no-walk policies, contingency plans, etc.” (DRC staff, Sana’a).*

⁷ In this regard, aside from its regular services (SMS, alerts, briefings, training), ISAO will issue a briefing paper in October 2013, suggested by a member, to illustrate commonalities among reported incidents and help reduce the vulnerability of foreign staff to the kidnapping threat.

- **Change in mindset:** *“Personally and professionally, kidnappings have changed things. Lately, I feel less confident about driving around despite the twenty years I have spent in Yemen. Old-timers are as likely to be kidnapped as newcomers. Here in Sana’a, kidnapping has become a business – not tribal ones anymore. We fly everywhere, we no longer drive.” (Global Communities staff, Sana’a).*
- **Distrust and paranoia:** *“The economic stakes have become huge, in an extremely volatile context. Who shall I trust? We have had the same driver since 2009 but can I still trust him? (...) Foreigners are targeted for economic reasons but no one knows exactly where it comes from: criminality, governmental actors, Al Qaeda? It also questions what we do in this country. We are not economic puppets.” (INGO Deputy Country Director, Sana’a).*
- **Tensions at work:** *“There is definitely a tension between old-timers, who speak Arabic and consider that Sana’a is their home town, and newcomers, who are good and obedient civil servants. In our organisation, kidnapping threats have not necessarily led to a better understanding of the existing security situation; it has only contributed to exacerbate the tensions between newcomers and oldtimers” (INGO Security Manager, Sana’a).*
- **Lack of sources:** *“Also, the way information is manipulated, hidden, etc. at the source creates some distrust. We rely completely on ISAO but maybe the way information is conveyed to us is filtered. We don’t know. It’s a black box for most INGO workers” (Global Communities staff, Sana’a).*
- **Lack of analysis:** *“I was surprised to see how relax the international community was! Compared with Sudan, Libya or Pakistan. I have managed the first kidnappings in Darfur and people were much more aware of the risk than in Sana’a” (Oxfam staff, Sana’a).*
- **Absence of security management planning:** *“The ISAO critical incident management, targeted to Country Directors and Deputy Country Directors, was an eye-opener for many people. Answers were so naïve. People were completely stressed by the exercise... which was only an exercise. In fact, most small NGOs are clueless and lack basic awareness. They assume that they have God or ISAO on their side!” (INGO Deputy Country Director, Sana’a).*

Perceptions of ISAO's services

✓ Perception of ISAO as an organisation

ISAO's branding. Although the majority of beneficiaries – in both 2012 and 2013 – recognize the status of ISAO as a non-governmental organization, confusion still persists: 6 per cent see it as a private entity, another 3% as a UN agency and 11% do not seem to know which category ISAO belongs to.

One in five respondent is mistaken on the status of ISAO. This can be corrected through greater attention paid to communications and branding – with revised brochures, mission statement below each email alert and at the end of each report that is circulated. One of the key lessons taught to NGOs by security advisors is the need to clarify their identity to external actors – to avoid negative perceptions, or confusion on the objectives and mission of an NGO. This lesson has to be applied to ISAO with a stronger branding. We will return to this point on communications and branding in the recommendations section.

Table 6. Which of the following best describes what ISAO is?

| | 2013 | 2012 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|
| A private security company | 6% | 7% |
| An NGO project | 80% | 84% |
| A UN agency | 3% | 7% |
| A foreign government agency | 0% | 0% |
| I don't know | 11% | 2% |

ISAO's funding. Confusion continues over ISAO's funding source(s). While ISAO is fully funded by ECHO – through CARE – and is a *free* service as advertised on all outgoing emails, 12 per cent of respondents think that ISAO relies on member contributions. This is a decrease from 2012 where 38 per cent thought they financially contributed to ISAO's services. The trend is positive but the confusion widespread – from USAID, DFID, members' contributions, CARE and OXFAM – the multiplicity of actors associated with ISAO is in contradiction with the ground reality.

Calling for more (stable) funding. Stakeholders –INGO members and governmental organizations like GIZ – through their security managers have voiced their concerns about the funding of ISAO, as illustrated in the quote below. Others have expressed the need for more funding to allow for ISAO to be able to recruit an additional international staff to help build the capacity, and boost the level of ISAO's international staff. INGOs assessed a gap between international and national capacity within ISAO – an organisation that some consider overly dependent on one staff (the project manager) whose level of analysis is currently unparalleled within the organisation.

*“They have to fight to get their stability.
First, donors should think about another way to operate (multi-year funding)
Second, why can't we pay for their services?
Third, they have the capacity to deliver what they promise and establish a network.”*

- GIZ security manager, July 2013

The amalgam between ISAO and the INGO forum persists. Although the two have been dissociated since 2012, this separation has not trickled down at the beneficiary level. This may be partly a result of the “@ingoforum-yemen.org” domain, and the link to the www.ingoforum-yemen.org website on ISAO staff emails. Our recommendations for an improved communications strategy will address these issues.

Table 7. Source of ISAO funding

| | 2013 | | 2012 | |
|-------------------------------|------|-----|------|-----|
| ECHO | 44 | 39% | 22 | 49% |
| USAID | 5 | 4% | 2 | 4% |
| DFID | 5 | 4% | 3 | 7% |
| Members' contributions | 13 | 12% | 17 | 38% |
| CARE | 24 | 21% | 8 | 18% |
| OXFAM | 3 | 3% | 2 | 4% |
| Other | 0 | 0% | 3 | 7% |
| I don't know | 19 | 17% | 13 | 29% |

✓ **ISAO's capacity**

In 2012, the external evaluation team reported that “ISAO is relevant in terms of activities provided – but their quality and delivery can be improved”. One of the issues raised then was ISAO's inability to reach its time and budget targets.

Timeliness and confidence levels. In 2013, the assessment on ‘timeliness’ was extremely positive – 92 per cent confirmed ISAO's timeliness, which also contributed to the 96 per cent confidence or trust level in ISAO (Table 8a).

Table 8a. Perceptions of ISAO's capacity to deliver

| | RELIABILITY | STAFF AVAILABILITY | QUALITY OF SERVICE | NEUTRALITY | TRUST | TIMELINESS |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|------------|
| Very good | 59% | 53% | 57% | 59% | 59% | 51% |
| Good | 40% | 40% | 37% | 36% | 37% | 41% |
| Average | 1% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 8% |
| Poor | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% |
| Very poor | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |

Growing beneficiary perceptions of ISAO's capacity. ISAO in 2013 continues on the same positive trends highlighted in 2012 – with significant higher marks for reliability, staff availability, quality of service and neutrality.

This is a double-edged sword: qualitative data showed that with higher performance come higher expectations. The ISAO team has raised standards of expectations and will need to live up to them in 2014. At a time of hardening security conditions in Yemen, this means the relevance and reliance on ISAO will only increase in the near and far future – and that expectations will have to be met.

Table 8b. Comparative assessment of ISAO capacity 2012 vs. 2013


| | RELIABILITY | | STAFF AVAILABILITY | | QUALITY OF SERVICE | | NEUTRALITY | |
|------------------|-------------|------|--------------------|------|--------------------|------|------------|------|
| | 2013 | 2012 | 2013 | 2012 | 2013 | 2012 | 2013 | 2012 |
| Very good | 59% | 34% | 53% | 38% | 57% | 42% | 59% | 42% |
| Good | 40% | 62% | 40% | 44% | 37% | 54% | 36% | 42% |
| Average | 1% | 2% | 5% | 14% | 5% | 2% | 4% | 12% |
| Poor | 0% | 0% | 1% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 2% |
| Very poor | 0% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 2% |

Speaking of capacity, and hence of capacity building, beneficiaries were positive about the contributions of both foreign and national staff who are part of the ISAO management structure. Whereas the 2012 evaluation called for a re-articulation of ISAO’s management structure, NGO beneficiaries in 2013 described a balanced management set-up that was neither overly dependent on foreign staff nor still suffering from an over-reliance on management staff, that had been raised as a prior weakness of the organisation (Graph 3).

Caution on the disparities in capacity within ISAO. Despite a positive overall assessment, INGO respondents interviewed raised two concerns.

- (i) Sana’a vs. Aden – the geographic coverage of ISAO has increased but the quality of the information is not at the same level, with Sana’a providing stronger analysis while Aden’s SMS and email alerts are considered more factual than analytical. “In Aden, we receive SMSs that are not always accurate, for example on road closures, which leads us to ask: is the information triangulated the same was as it is in Sana’a?”, INGO staff member, July 2013.
- (ii) International vs. national staff – the over-reliance on 1 international for the in-depth analysis remains a weakness of ISAO’s current structure. While some argued for the need for additional funding to hire one more international staff member, they also highlighted the need to invest more resources in capacity building of ISAO’s national staff, who do a good job covering information, but who are not relied upon for in-depth analysis.

Graph 3. What do you think about the ISAO’s management structure?



✓ **ISAO's services and deliverables**

In 2012, the 5 most useful tools were incident alerts (SMS), email advisories, trainings, monthly bulletins and weekly reports. In 2013, email advisories stand out with 83 per cent rating the service as “very good” and 13 per cent as “good”. This is in part due to the improved quality of analysis of the reports in the email advisories – both highlighting trends and impact for beneficiaries (forward looking).

ISAO's strength lie in its reporting to beneficiaries – SMS, email advisories, bimonthly and quarterly reports, and country briefs – and its contextual analysis. However, ISAO rates lower on trainings and workshops and bilateral briefings (Table 9).

ISAO's weaknesses lie in its capacity building initiatives - whether trainings and workshops or bilateral briefings. This should not hide the fact that over half of the responses were either satisfied or very satisfied with these services – however over one quarter found them to be average or below average.

Table 9. Rating of ISAO services

| | SMS | Emails Advisories | ISAO Bimonthly | ISAO Quarterly | Country Brief | Training and Workshops | Bilateral Briefings |
|------------------|-----|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| Very good | 59% | 83% | 51% | 49% | 40% | 29% | 29% |
| Good | 29% | 13% | 40% | 43% | 49% | 36% | 43% |
| Average | 8% | 3% | 7% | 5% | 9% | 24% | 25% |
| Poor | 1% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 5% | 1% |
| Very poor | 3% | 0% | 3% | 1% | 1% | 5% | 1% |

Table 10. Rating of ISAO's contextual analyses

| Overall, are the contextual analyses provided by ISAO relevant to you and your organisation? | |
|---|-----|
| Yes, absolutely relevant | 51% |
| Relevant | 36% |
| Neutral | 13% |
| Poorly relevant | 0% |
| Irrelevant | 0% |

Relatively speaking the weaknesses of ISAO's services lie in the theoretical application of its knowledge, while its strength rest in the practical aspects of reporting on contextual trends, incidents and their ramification.

- Focusing on the strength of its reporting has allowed ISAO to build a strong network and wide coverage, disseminating its knowledge effectively and making itself relevant to the day to day operations of beneficiary NGOs. From contextual analyses to SMS alerts, ISAO's written reporting receives high ratings;
- However, to build on this coverage and provide more depth – to supplement a horizontal approach with a more vertical impact – ISAO will need to focus in 2014 on a new approach to trainings, workshops and bilateral briefs, and a new approach to capacity building of their own internal potential outside of Sana'a, to be developed further in our recommendations section.

BOX. ISAO's TOOLS – Characteristics and Impact

✓ 5 key characteristics

The strength of ISAO's tools lies in 5 key characteristics – underlined by all stakeholders interviewed, in absolute and relative terms to other security/safety advisories available in Yemen (whether comparing ISAO with UNDSS, Safer Yemen, or other security sources):

1. Information is detailed

Reports that come out of ISAO include an analysis – never just about facts.

2. Information is systematically triangulated

ISAO is known for not releasing any information before a rigorous internal check and triangulation with ISAO's network of contacts in the country. This triangulation is seen as central to the credibility of the information released.

3. Information is made available first by ISAO

"I hear about things by Phil before I hear them from my staff." – DRC Country director.

4. Information, not rumours

"When anything happens, within one hour, we receive a SMS that is not based on rumours but has already benefited from their triangulation process. If we need to talk, they pick up the phone". – *Global Communities country representative.*

5. Recommendations are not prescriptions, yet general enough to be adapted by each INGO

"ISAO has an advisory role, not a prescriptive one (legally accountable for 53 INGOs with different missions and security situations and approaches). It would be dishonest and dangerous to recommend or prescribe anything specific." - CARE Country director.

✓ Impact on INGO perceptions and preparedness

1. Trust building

On the basis of the 5 key characteristics, ISAO has built relationships of trust with INGOs.

"Phil [ISAO project manager] always screens the information. So when Phil says something, it is actually the case. We trust him. And trust is the key factor. It is everything in the security business. We take his advice seriously. Also, it is timely, accurate, analytical." - CARE Country director.

2. Confidence levels

The ripple effect of the trust built is a parallel confidence building of INGOs, who are reassured about their capacity to access reliable information and hence to ensure the security and safety of their own staff. The subjective feeling of being better equipped to face an increasingly insecure environment, puts heads of INGOs in control. Confidence is a pre-requisite for proper security management.

3. More knowledgeable partners

Although not prescriptive, recommendations/analysis is sufficiently general to allow for an INGO to appropriate it and adapt it to their needs. In 2013, INGOs are more knowledgeable on safety and security than in 2012.

Added value of ISAO's services

✓ ISAO's added value

Notwithstanding the strengths and weaknesses outlined above, ISAO's added value is recognized both on personal safety and security management. Over 80 per cent of respondents rate a positive impact of ISAO services on their personal safety as well as their organisation's security management (Table 9). Slightly more respondents underlined the positive impact on the organisation's security management, while personal safety came in as a close second.

"ISAO saves NGOs money. It is excellent value for money."

- *INGO Forum staff,
July 2013*


Combining this assessment with the fact that NGOs tend to focus more on security than safety can provide clear strategic guidelines for ISAO to develop a stronger "personal safety" approach to its beneficiaries' needs – as safety tends to be under-valued by security service users who emphasize external security threats more than safety hazards and risks. ISAO's added value will be in helping to change such mentality.

To be noted – although the samples were not identical in 2012 and 2013 – that the impact ratings between show a slightly downward trend (Table 11, Graphs 4 and 5). This can be the result of sampling differences, but also of rising expectations of ISAO's work, mentioned in the previous pages. With higher quality services, beneficiary expectations have also risen. With higher quality services, beneficiaries are now also better equipped – in their own view and subjective assessment – to respond to safety and security risks.


Table 11. Rating of ISAO's impact on safety and security management

| How do you rate the impact of ISAO on..... | Your personal safety | | | Your organisation's security management? | | |
|--|----------------------|------|-------|--|------|-------|
| | 2013 | 2012 | Trend | 2013 | 2012 | Trend |
| Excellent | 24% | 36% | -12 | 35% | 44% | -9 |
| Good | 57% | 53% | +4 | 53% | 53% | - |
| Neutral | 15% | 11% | +4 | 11% | 3% | +8 |
| Poor | 4% | 0% | +4 | 1% | 0% | +1 |
| Useless | 0% | 0% | - | 0% | 0% | - |

Graph 4. How do you rate the impact of ISAO on your personal safety?



Graph 5. How do you rate the impact of ISAO on your organisation's security management?



✓ ISAO's added value in comparative terms

ISAO vs. UNDSS services – an assessment by NGOs. The 2012 external assessment cautions about possible comparisons between UNDSS and ISAO services (the former being tailored first and foremost for UN agencies, then second only to NGOs, whereas the latter only focuses on international NGOs), the comparison is still valid as NGOs receive the UNDSS reports. The close collaboration between UNDSS and ISAO in Yemen at the time of this evaluation – an achievement in 2013 – has allowed for a dual security access for NGOs. In this setting, it is possible then to compare the security alerts that NGOs receive.

When asked to compare the quality of the UNDSS daily reports and weekly assessments with that of ISAO, the ratings were across the board positive, with noticeably higher ratings for ISAO.

- Between 64 - 69 per cent for UNDSS daily reports / weekly reports (Table 11),
- Between 88 per cent and 96 per cent for ISAO's reporting (Table 8).

UNDSS' feedback on ISAO. Feedback from UNDSS also points to an improved relation with ISAO and to the necessity of having both services, given the lack of accurate risk perceptions by NGOs and misconceptions of the concept of community acceptance. UNDSS goes further and speaks of an ISAO service that is customer oriented and pragmatic.

"ISAO's approach is extremely pragmatic and analytical; they do make a difference here "
- UNDSS staff

This raises two positive findings:

- ISAO's high ratings in comparison with other security services:** ISAO's ratings are higher than UNDSS' mainly due to more in-depth analysis and stronger advisories
- No overlap of security services – ISAO's niche:** ISAO's services do not duplicate UNDSS' – while UNDSS provides daily and weekly reporting, ISAO specializes in security and email alerts, bimonthly and quarterly reports, with a model build around incident-based reporting and in-depth risk analysis, which are today valued higher by NGOs.

Table 12. Comparative review of UNDSS and ISAO services

| | UNDSS daily reports | UNDSS weekly |
|------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Very good | 40% | 27% |
| Good | 29% | 36% |
| Average | 28% | 29% |
| Poor | 3% | 3% |
| Very poor | 0% | 5% |

ISAO vs. other security service providers – an assessment by NGOs. ISAO's relevance stands in comparison to other safety and security advisors that NGOs in Yemen have relied on: 64 per cent consider ISAO more relevant than other advisors, 19 per cent as relevant, and 6 per cent less relevant.

More knowledgeable beneficiaries. While in 2012 30 per cent of INGO beneficiaries only relied on ISAO for their safety and security services, in 2013, our evaluation finds that 11 per cent of respondents only use ISAO's services.

ISAO as one of several or only source of information? As less INGOs rely solely on ISAO compared to 2012, this is a positive trend that shows more knowledge and awareness among the pool of international INGOs in Yemen, the result of stricter security management strategies and of the realization. After two years of ISAO presence that ISAO’s objective is to share information rather than act as a security provider for NGOs. This trend towards warning systems is a positive one given the changes since 2012. As shown in an interview led with Save the Children, INGOs are increasingly conscious of the fact that ISAO information is one resource among others that is used to triangulate information. At the same time, others still rely on ISAO as their main source of security – not having their own security officers in-house.

ISAO’s view

“At what point are we doing too much? Efficient warning system vs. counterproductive comfort zone. We cannot provide INGOs with ready-made and tailored contingency plans. We provide information, we enable them to make informed decisions – but no prescription.”

- Conversation with ISAO staff member

INGOs’ view

“When we receive their information, we use it to fuel our analysis. We know their capacity, we use their reports, we triangulate: it systematically corroborates our findings – we are a first source. But we cannot fully rely on them, we have to create our own sources and analytical frames.”

- Save the Children staff, July 2013

Another INGOs’ view

“We are very happy with the work of ISAO to the extent that we do not have a security person in-house. Emails, SMS, analyses are great. Today, we have our own internal and informal information system, we respect ISAO warnings (SMS, emails) and we use their information to make decisions.”

- CHF staff, July 2013

Table 13. Relevance of ISAO services compared to other security service providers

| | If your organisation is using the services of other safety and security actors do you think ISAO’s services are more or less relevant to you? | |
|----------------------------|---|------|
| | 2013 | 2012 |
| Clearly more relevant | 34 | 45% |
| Slightly more relevant | 14 | 19% |
| As relevant | 14 | 19% |
| Slightly less relevant | 4 | 5% |
| Clearly less relevant | 1 | 1% |
| I only use ISAO’s services | 8 | 11% |
| | | 34% |
| | | 8% |
| | | 30% |

✓ **Practical added value of ISAO's services**

Real-time use of ISAO services. Beyond receiving information or training from ISAO, beneficiaries also show a pro-active approach in their use of ISAO services. Over half of beneficiaries – 59 per cent – have relied on ISAO in real time when confronted with an incident and were overall satisfied – 61 per cent – with the response received (Table 14). Although half of them use the information in conjunction and triangulation with other information received, in 37 per cent of cases ISAO is the main reference for security for INGOs and in 5 per cent the only reference for security.


ISAO's field credibility recognized? The field credibility of ISAO is recognized by 24 per cent of respondents who state using ISAO services for checks before travelling to certain parts of the country (Graph 6). This raises the question as to why more beneficiaries do not systematically rely on ISAO for field checks? Given the concerns over security related to movement (carjacking and kidnappings), field assessments would seem central. Qualitative interviews suggest that beneficiaries are not entirely convinced by the coverage of ISAO's activities in all of Yemen, seeing it as a useful source of information rather than a real time source of information for the field. The switch from a contextual service, to a more practical field-based service for NGOs needs to be emphasized and strengthened in ISAO's future activities.

However, this does not mean managing regional networks of information at the community level, a responsibility which should remain entirely that of INGOs that work through local partners. ISAO would not have the time, nor the experience as a young organisation, to be able to provide stronger networks.

Table 14. Reliance on ISAO at the time of incident

| Has your organisation ever used ISAO services when confronted with an incident? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Yes | 44 | 59% |
| No | 31 | 41% |
| If yes, were you satisfied with their response? | | |
| Very satisfied | 18 | 24% |
| Satisfied | 28 | 37% |
| Neutral | 25 | 33% |
| No satisfied | 3 | 4% |
| Strongly disappointed | 1 | 1% |

Graph 6. How do you use the information provided by ISAO? (in %)



Perception and satisfaction of security training

“We desperately need training, for different purposes – including for the local staff. The problem is that they do not perceive risks and threats the way we perceive them. They are used to living with it.”


- DRC Country Director, July 2013

Induction vs. thematic and support trainings. The most popular trainings to date have been the induction trainings proposed to new arrivals (47 per cent) and security awareness workshops attended by over half of the respondents interviewed (55 per cent). However, thematic trainings such as the IDP / Refugee / Migrant workshop ranked lowest with only a 7 per cent attendance rate. As reviewed in the context analysis of this report, the migration and displacement challenge is a humanitarian priority in Yemen – yet ISAO’s relevance on this particular thematic area of utmost concern to practitioners is low. Furthermore, beyond staff induction training, only one third and one fourth of NGOs, respectively, report providing their drivers and guards with ISAO security training.

This highlights two areas of further investigation and strategic orientation for ISAO: Focus trainings on:

- Raising ISAO’s appeal for thematic workshops on key humanitarian challenges,
- Increasing ISAO’s relevance for routine training of support staff – drivers and guards.

Graph 7. Which ISAO training workshop did your organisation follow?



Qualitative interviews with beneficiaries provide suggestions to fill in the training gaps:

1. *Thematic training tailored to Humanitarian priorities*
 - Intensive Course in Humanitarian Affairs
2. *Personal security workshops*
 - Scenario mapping (how to behave if kidnapped)
 - Self-defense courses
 - First Aid
 - Security Awareness for local staff

- Fire and electrical safety
3. *Organisational trainings*
- Negotiation in hostile environments
 - Conflict resolution
 - Security assessments for guesthouses and office spaces
4. *Staff security trainings*
- For security officers or security focal points
 - Security sensitivity training for national staff
 - Refresher trainings for drivers and guards
 - Defensive driving for drivers

Awareness / security sensitivity training for local employees. Although the main concern for INGOs is the security of their international staff, qualitative interviews showed a consensus: increasing the awareness sensitivity to security of local employees will lead to a greater reliability and accuracy of sources within INGOs. In an effort to build their own capacity to assess the situation, INGOs would need training for local employees.

Bringing in experienced trainers vs. responding to government suspicions. Government suspicion over ISAO activities has resulted in a major obstacle to conducting specialized training for INGOs and strengthening this comparatively weaker component of ISAO services. It should be noted that discussions will be necessary at the donor – government level to soften tensions and open doors for ISAO to engage in more ambitious trainings. One way around this, as suggested by a INGO staff, would be to show the government that an organisation warning foreigners and training them is a positive element for the government, as kidnappings are detrimental to the country’s image and might slow down the pace of NGO returns that has been noted since 2011. A stronger security environment for internationals can only benefit business or tourism.

“The government sees them as spies. When ISAO wanted to provide a training on safety and security management to INGOs, the government refused to give a visa to the trainer.”
 - Conversation with CARE staff member

Benefiting from the INGO Forum’s relations with the government. Interviews with INGOs showed a strong and good dialogue between the INGO Forum and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and a “burgeoning relationship with the Ministry of Interior (MoI)”, to use the terms employed by one of the stakeholders interviewed in July 2013. The INGO Forum is taking the lead on talking to the Ministry about development priorities, visa issues, outreach to the government and overall, of improving the relationship with NGOs. This is an effort that will have to be closely followed by ISAO as it could provide an overture towards stronger and more positive relations with the government. Other INGOs also provide support to ISAO – CHF notably mentioned that they were insisting on the fact that “ISAO is safety, not security”, especially with the MoI which is more reluctant than the MoPIC. The same representative acknowledged that, whenever faced with visa issues for INGOs, donors (DFID, EU) but also OCHA were involved to sort out such bottlenecks with the governments.

Interactions with beneficiaries (INGOs)

“We cannot work without ISAO, I would shoot myself in the foot” – INGO security officer, July 2013

One of the key shortcomings highlighted in the 2012 review was the lack of a ‘two-way relationship’ between ISAO and its end users. Instead of being seen as a *collaboration forum*, the review emphasized most NGOs’ view of ISAO as a *service provider*. The current evaluation will provide a more nuanced feedback, as the depth and scope of interactions are stronger than the findings of the 2012 evaluation led to believe. Furthermore, the nature of ISAO as a service provider should not be contested as a negative element. ISAO’s own description of its work and mandate places it as a ‘free service’ for INGOs:

The INGO Safety Advisory Office (ISAO) is dedicated to providing information and advice to INGOs in Yemen for the safety of their staff, assets and programs. [...] As a free service to INGOs, neither ISAO nor its donors or partners accept any liability whatsoever for claims resulting from the provision or utilisation of these free services.

Finally, the feedback received from INGOs shows a relationship built around ideas of partnership and collaboration, rather than a beneficiary or client-based approach (Table 15). Indeed, 40 per cent see themselves as partners of ISAO, 27 per cent as colleagues, and 9 per cent as users. Only one fourth of the respondents described themselves as beneficiaries or clients of the ISAO service. This should not hide the fact that some INGO staff members interviewed still considered being a client of ISAO, considering that they pay for services through annual fees. In this regard, refresher courses will be necessary.

“I see myself as a client”
- INGO staff member under the impression that INGOs pay annual fees


Table 15. Nature of INGO – ISAO relationship

| How do you see your organisation as part of the ISAO network? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Beneficiary | 14 | 19% |
| Client | 4 | 5% |
| Partner | 30 | 40% |
| Colleague | 20 | 27% |
| User | 7 | 9% |

The next section of this evaluation will focus on the regularity of exchanges between ISAO and its beneficiaries (INGOs): What is the current depth and breadth of this relationship?

Regularity of attendance at ISAO meetings and briefings should be significantly improved as currently only one fourth systematically attend ISAO meetings and briefings while a higher number never attend meetings – either because they were not expressly invited, had not heard about the meetings or did not take the necessary steps to attend them. The cut is almost 50/50 between those who systematically attend and those who never attend, while the remaining half of respondents attend the meeting irregularly (Graph 8).

Graph 8. How often do you attend ISAO meetings/briefings?



Strength of ties outside of meetings, through information sharing. The strength of ISAO – INGO ties rests outside of formal meetings and debrief sessions, in more regular updates and information sharing. In this regard, INGO’s relationship with ISAO fits with a collaboration framework more than that of a service provider, a positive trend. When asked whether their organisation shared information with ISAO, 73 per cent responded positively, with one third doing so systematically. Another 9 per cent expressed their interest in doing so in the future – highlighting an opportunity for ISAO to extend beyond its current network (Table 16).

Table 16. Information sharing INGO - ISAO

| Does your organisation provide information to ISAO? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Yes, systematically | 25 | 33% |
| Sometimes | 30 | 40% |
| Not often | 12 | 16% |
| No, we generally do not but would like to | 7 | 9% |
| No, we never do and cannot do (internal policies) | 1 | 1% |

Table 17. Type of information shared INGO - ISAO

| If yes, what type of information does it provide? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Contextual updates on security | 24 | 21% |
| Information on incidents involving your NGO | 42 | 36% |
| Updates on any security information you find | 32 | 28% |
| We do not provide information to ISAO | 6 | 5% |
| I do not wish to disclose | 3 | 3% |
| Other | 9 | 8% |

The frequency of information sharing is mainly weekly or monthly: 20 per cent interact with ISAO several times a week, 13 per cent once a week, and 27 per cent once a month. Others did not have information on the frequency of information sharing, while only 7 per cent mentioned not having any interaction on information sharing or support with ISAO.

Table 18. Frequency of INGO – ISAO interactions

| How frequently does your organisation provide ISAO with information or support? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Almost Every day | 0 | 0% |
| Frequently / several times per week | 15 | 20% |
| Often / once a week | 10 | 13% |

| | | |
|--------------|----|-----|
| Once a month | 20 | 27% |
| Never | 5 | 7% |
| I don't know | 25 | 33% |

An informal yet systematic interaction. One third did not know the frequency of interaction between their INGO and ISAO – this is partly due to the informal nature of interactions (Table 19): 27 per cent described their interactions with ISAO as informal, as opposed to 5 per cent who spoke of a formalized exchange. The relationship is therefore informal but also prioritized and systematic – 34 per cent – as opposed to erratic or secondary (4 per cent).

Table 19. Quality of INGO – ISAO information sharing

| Which adjective(s) best describe(s) the information sharing between your INGO (sender) and ISAO (receiver)? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Informal | 33 | 27% |
| Prioritized | 22 | 18% |
| Systematic | 19 | 16% |
| Functional | 18 | 15% |
| Random | 12 | 10% |
| Other | 7 | 6% |
| Formalized | 6 | 5% |
| Erratic | 2 | 2% |
| Secondary | 3 | 2% |

The informal nature of the relationship benefits INGOs who see a potential to influence the way ISAO functions, prioritizes its activities and delivers its services. Table 20 provides an assessment of the level of perceived influence of these INGOs on ISAO operations. On average, INGOs score highest on their ability to influence functions and service delivery rather than priority setting – hence still able to influence the content, without necessarily influencing the management. This fits with the expectations of a collaborative relationship as envisioned in ISAO’s mandate.

Table 20. INGO influence over ISAO

| Do you consider you can influence the way ISAO... | | | |
|---|-----------|------------|------------------|
| | Functions | Priorities | Service Delivery |
| A lot | 16% | 17% | 16% |
| Slightly | 24% | 20% | 23% |
| Somewhat | 29% | 27% | 32% |
| A little | 13% | 15% | 19% |
| Not at all | 17% | 21% | 11% |

This influence is welcomed by ISAO staff who see it as necessary to triangulate information with INGOs – ISAO has been requesting at its meeting for INGOs to increase their cooperation, noting that the information on the security context is provided by a minority of INGOs – pointing to the need to strengthen such ties in the future.

“Is it necessary to triangulate the information with local communities? INGOs do this for ISAO. When there is a problem in a district, the INGO calls the community, checks, warns ISAO. There is no need to double check with local partners, communities or national INGOs.

[...] There is a particular responsibility of our member INGOs to report information on the security context for the benefit of all organisations.”

- ISAO staff member, July 2013

Picture 2: Critical Incident Management training (Sana'a)



III. Strategic trade-offs and recommendations

Throughout the face-to-face interviews conducted with ISAO's beneficiaries, some suggestions or recommendations have frequently been made. Most of them are evidence either of INGOs' concerns or of misunderstandings on ISAO's role; last, other recommendations may feed into ISAO's future strategic plan and objectives.

From an advisory to a prescriptive role?

A significant number of our key informant interviewees insisted on ISAO providing more specific recommendations, while identifying the main obstacle to such a drastic change in ISAO's approach: how could security recommendations be tailored to each INGO, while they are so different in their respective philosophy, objectives, staff, beneficiaries, and areas of operations? In other words, the recommendations should naturally be tailored to the risk profile of every organisation. However, many INGOs said that they would accept to pay a specific membership to benefit from ISAO's expertise and recommendations: *"For us, it is better to rely on ISAO to guarantee our security: we have no experience, we do not have the time to seriously take care of it, and they have a better information network in urban centres – where our country office and sub-offices are"* (INGO, Country Director, Sana'a).

Quantitatively, 86% of the 2013 survey respondents said that they would like ISAO to provide their organisation with more practical security recommendations, as shown in the graph and table below. From the face-to-face in-depth interviews with ISAO's beneficiaries, it seems that there are two main reasons for such a clear demand:

- Some interviewees consider that ISAO is probably better suited to provide them with contextual analyses and security recommendations than anyone else – hence their interest in *"subcontracting this task to a reliable and trustworthy actor like ISAO"* (INGO, Programme Officer and Security Manager, Sana'a);
- Other respondents have almost no clue about security management and contextual analysis and only have a vague idea of what it actually implies – hence their interest in *"delegating security management and analysis to people who know what they are talking about"* (INGO, Country Director, Aden).

What does it imply for an actor like ISAO in today's environment? Such a clear trend among quantitative respondents and key informant interviewees highlights three interesting findings:

- First, it is worth noting that among the few (3) respondents who said that ISAO should not provide its members with more practical recommendations, none of them gave "lack of capacity" as a reason: *"I do not think ISAO should give specific security recommendations; it does not mean that they could not – providing that they put some means to this end – but I really think it would be a mistake"* (INGO, Country Director, Sana'a). Once again, ISAO members and observers never question ISAO's actual or potential capacity with regards to security analysis and management.
- Most ISAO beneficiaries are still unclear about what ISAO is/can be and what it cannot be: *"Our role and objective is not to take their responsibilities. We provide information, we double-check, we help them make their decision but we cannot make any decision for them and instead of them."*

We are not a security contractor, which is also the reason why we have a good network in many provinces in Yemen” (ISAO Operations Analyst, Sana’a).

- Many INGOs still have no proper security management – nor do they have any real situational analysis of their areas of operations – which explains why they want to delegate these crucial responsibilities to an organisation unanimously known for its professionalism: *“NGOs that delegate contextual analyses or security management miss the point. There are things you cannot externalize or subcontract. This is precisely ISAO’s role to remind the INGO community that they should pay a closer attention to security management and improve their situation reporting capacity” (ISAO Observer, Sana’a).*




Table 21. Practical security recommendations feedback

| Should ISAO provide its members with more practical security recommendations? | | |
|---|----|-----|
| Yes, absolutely | 31 | 42% |
| Yes, why not | 34 | 45% |
| No, it's not ISAO's role | 3 | 4% |
| No, ISAO does not have the capacity | 0 | 0% |
| I don't know | 4 | 5% |
| Other | 3 | 4% |

RECOMMENDATION: The review team tends to consider that ISAO’s role and mandate shall not be “more prescriptive”. Firstly, INGOs shall never delegate their contextual analysis and security management; secondly, ISAO’s recommendations – as they figure in their alerts, briefs, and reports – are down-to-earth and pragmatic enough to help any experienced INGO security manager draw his/her own conclusions.

From a free membership to a capitalistic model?

Both qualitative and quantitative findings favour the idea that, generally speaking, ISAO beneficiaries would be ready to pay a specific fee to ISAO for its existing advisory services (12%) or for additional services (15%). However, it should also be noted that there is a negative trend between 2012 and 2013 (-7 percentage points), as if organisations were less likely or willing to pay for ISAO’s services. Symmetrically, more people tend to think that ISAO’s services should be free: +13 percentage points.

Table 22. Practical security recommendations feedback

| Should ISAO charge a fee in addition to the fee your organisation already pays to the INGO Forum? | | | | | |
|---|------|-----|------|-----|-------|
| | 2013 | | 2012 | | Trend |
| Yes, if they provide additional services | 11 | 15% | | | |
| Yes, for the same services, if they need to | 9 | 12% | 23 | 51% | -7 |
| Why not? | 13 | 17% | | | |
| No, there is no reason | 14 | 19% | | | |
| No, it should be a free services | 16 | 21% | 12 | 27% | +13 |
| Other | 12 | 16% | 10 | 22% | +6 |

As this trend clearly contradicts the extremely high satisfaction rates and positive feedbacks we had recorded, we asked some of our key informants what they were thinking about a possible financial contribution to ISAO:

- Some respondents suggested that ISAO starts developing additional paying services “like ANSO in Afghanistan, for instance” (Mercy Corps, Security Manager), as it would drastically and positively change the relationship between ISAO and its members, which would “then act as a responsible clients and customers, and not as simple users anymore” (INGO Security Manager, Aden);
- Others insisted on the specificity of the INGO community and situation in Yemen, where “the security context is getting worse everyday and requires that everyone shares information with everyone” (GIZ Security Manager, Sana’a).

RECOMMENDATION: ISAO’s mandate and role shall remain advisory, analytical, and neutral. Likewise, in today’s context and considering ISAO’s history and capacity, the review team considers that the development of additional (paying) services is neither realistic (capacity) nor recommendable. One of ISAO’s strengths and key factor of success relies in its ability to be a neutral and non-for-profit facilitator between the UN, INGOs, Embassies, security contractors, etc.; by providing paying and exclusive services, ISAO would necessarily blur these lines.

A 24/7 security watch?

A recurring suggestion to ISAO was to dedicate some of its staff and office space for a 24/7 security watch. While praising ISAO’s reactivity and timeliness, some key informant interviewees insisted on the clear worsening of the security situation to legitimate a more systematic approach towards surveillance: *“Most international organisations do not realize that times have changed. We need continuous updates and a night and day security watch”* (INGO, Deputy Country Director, Sana’a). If many interviewees acknowledged that the actual impact of a 24/7 security watch would not add a lot of value to ISAO’s existing services, most of them also insist on the positive psychological impact to systematize a night and day security watch.

As shown in the table below, this tendency is confirmed by a rapid comparison between the 2012 and 2013 quantitative surveys: 10 more percentage points of respondents *absolutely agreed* with the idea of ISAO applying a 24/7 rule. Interestingly, 6% of the 2013 respondents said that it was not ISAO’s role, which corroborates some of our in-depth face-to-face: *“NGOs shall never delegate their security to anyone. ISAO does a great job but we cannot ask them to work night and day just for the sake of it... It is our role”* (INGO, Country Director, Sana’a).

Table 23. ISAO’s potential 24/7 presence

| Should ISAO provide a more complete service outside normal working hours (and apply a 24/7 rule)? | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|-------|
| | 2013 | | 2012 | | Trend |
| Yes, absolutely | 27 | 36% | 13 | 26% | +10 |
| Yes, why not | 23 | 31% | 17 | 34% | -3 |
| No, it’s not ISAO’s role | 6 | 8% | 12 | 24% | -8 |
| No, they do not have the capacity to do it | 6 | 8% | | | |
| I don’t know | 13 | 17% | 8 | 16% | +1 |
| Total | 75 | 100% | 50 | 100% | - |

RECOMMENDATION: A 24/7 presence is probably more a placebo than a fully cost-effective safety and security instrument. However, should the situation gets worse, with the uncertain political and social consequences of the National Dialogue, ISAO may have to develop a complete set of services outside normal working hours. It is already the case in practice and the ISAO project manager is available 24/7 in practice; a more systematic approach – on an exceptional basis, before and after the end of the ND or the elections, or on a long-term basis, if the situation gets worse on the long-run – may be considered.

Inclusion of NNGOs?

International NGOs are concerned about keeping their influence on ISAO distinct from that of national NGOs operating in the country (to be counted in the thousands) for three reasons:

- (i) NNGOs are known in Yemen to be, for many, key stakeholders in the conflict, which could cause ISAO to lose its neutrality,
- (ii) NNGOs have the humanitarian forum (about 75 NNGOs) who now need their own ISAO
- (iii) The threats and analyses for NNGOs and INGOs are not the same.

When asked whether they would welcome positively an inclusion of national NGOs as ISAO members, only 8 per cent responded positively, almost half only responded with conditionality clauses, while a vocal 46 per cent responded negatively. The danger INGOs opposed to NNGO inclusion expressed is the gap between an inclusive theoretical process and the practical risks these would entail – risks that could jeopardize the existence of the INGO forum and of ISAO as independent coordinating bodies. *“A vast acceptance of NNGOs within the ISAO network might raise the ISAO network’s profile in a detrimental manner”* – INGO staff member.

Table 24. Opinions on NNGO inclusion

| Do you think ISAO should also accept national NGOs as members? | | |
|--|----|-----|
| Yes, obviously, as soon as possible | 6 | 8% |
| On the long run, why not? | 13 | 17% |
| Only if clear transparency criteria are established | 21 | 28% |
| No in practice - even if it should be yes in theory | 18 | 24% |
| No, it would put ISAO and the INGO Forum at risk | 10 | 13% |
| Other | 7 | 9% |

Added value of ISAO to NNGOs? Others questioned the added value ISAO could bring to national NGOs given the very specific security risks that confront not all NGO staff but predominantly international staff. *“Since, contextually, the risks that apply to NNGOs are different from those that apply to INGOs, we cannot mix them in one network”*, explained an INGO staff member. *“The risk to internationals is specific and unique. It won’t add anything to NNGOs as they are not targeted as INGOs.”*

Questioning the neutrality of NNGOs. *“The discussions that we hold in meetings could be used against INGOs as we never know who is there and for what reasons – most of the NNGOs are not neutral. They are politically and/or religiously influenced by other parties. Thus, transparency, neutrality, and confidentiality may be put at risk.”* INGOs seemed more open to – and less suspicious of – including in the network security companies rather than NNGOs, showing the extent to which the “non governmental” label is only seen as a denomination, not a practical reality in the case of most NNGOs that are viewed as partisan and biased, not mission focused, by their international counterparts. This is a trend to be followed as the security situation might deteriorate in Yemen.

RECOMMENDATION: The review team considers that, in the highly politicized Yemeni context, it would be a major mistake to include NNGOs, as it would not only open Pandora’s Box (where to draw the line?) but also change the nature of ISAO and the INGO Forum.



IV. Conclusions for ISAO – Moving forward strategically

The current assessment of ISAO’s work is positive – trends have been improving since 2012, and INGO partners are satisfied with the capacity and services provided by ISAO. Many of them have also become more demanding with the organisation, as ISAO has improved the quality of its services, deliverables, and quality standards. However, the evaluation team cautions ISAO on two fronts:

First, the climate of the spring/summer 2013 indicates a deteriorating and potentially explosive security condition. All analyses point to the fact that the Transition process in Yemen will be anything but smooth and will lead to greater pressures and greater responsibility on ISAO. As such, the positive reviews in this evaluation should not lead the organisation nor its INGO partners minimize the major danger this evaluation has highlighted: the risk is to fall in a dangerous comfort zone where ISAO has become central to the functioning of many of the 53 partner INGOs (and observers), at a time when these NGOs will be increasingly relying on ISAO. Insecurity increases, so will expectations of ISAO’s input and misconceptions on its capacity and mandate.

Second, ISAO has built its capacity but has yet to build a thorough strategy adapted to this deteriorating context and to the weaknesses of most partner INGOs. As seen in this evaluation, NGOs are slowly becoming more robust in their knowledge and independence on security management. However, this is not the case for all INGOs. Many are still unprepared to handle a deteriorating security situation – ISAO’s strategy will have to be built therefore on three realizations: 1) its own structural weaknesses, 2) its relations with INGOs, and INGOs’ own weaknesses, and 3) the rapidly evolving environment, which will require more donor and more governmental support to its cause. This will partly be solved through an improved programming, outreach and fundraising strategy.

As a result, this conclusion will build on the analysis presented in this review to present a **10-point recommendations framework – leading to a new ISAO strategy for 2014:**

| A 10-point recommendations framework – ISAO’s transition to 2014 | |
|--|---|
| 1. Extending funding cycle | <i>I. Fundraising & Management Strategy</i> |
| 2. Strengthening the management structure | |
| 3. Institutionalizing platforms of dialogue | |
| 4. A sub-national office development strategy | <i>II. Outreach Strategy</i> |
| 5. Building a 2-way relationship with INGOs | |
| 6. Transferring and delegating risks | |
| 7. A communications and branding strategy | <i>III. Programming Strategy</i> |
| 8. An eye on technology | |
| 9. Filling in the training gap | |
| 10. From a theoretical to a practical field-based credibility | |

I. Fundraising and Management Strategy

1. Extending funding cycle.

ISAO has a 1-year strategy built around a 1-year funding. Discussions with donors (ECHO, DFID and potentially others) on more ambitious cycles (multi-year) and more flexible (contingency planning) should be led before the end of 2013. In the words of one stakeholder interviewed, now that ISAO has proven its capacity to fulfill expectations, donors can more easily fund a strategy built on the strengths, and addressing its weaknesses.

2. Strengthening the management structure.

The management now rests primarily on 1 person – the project manager – leading to what stakeholders have identified as a personalisation of ISAO. Even though they also recognized the growing capacity of the national staff, INGOs interviewed for this review associated high levels of analysis, and the process of trust building, as the result of one person’s work and leadership within the existing ISAO structure. This dependency is not sustainable – should the project manager leave or be absent. An extended funding cycle needs to allow ISAO to hire more staff in specific thematic areas and at different levels of expertise – from analysis, to security management and finally advocacy and fundraising. At the moment, all these tasks are centralized in 1 position, who is “bankable” but who cannot be relied upon forever.

3. Institutionalizing platforms of dialogue.

“To be confirmed” is an informal group of 9 security managers of lead INGOs, who meet in a fluid, flexible way under the umbrella of ISAO to share information and good practices. In the same vein, ISAO will need to formalize the informal bridges that have recently been created and strengthened with UNDSS, Governmental organisations like GIZ, and with observers such as MSF and ICRC. Each of these actors may have an interest in sharing more information with ISAO. These bridges should not only be informal or dependent on personal contacts and networking initiatives, but be more formally institutionalized. Longer term, platforms of dialogue will need to be built with MoPIC and Mol if the current low profile of ISAO should require adaptation (notably if the training component of the ISAO strategy is to be significantly reinforced).

II. Outreach Strategy

4. A sub-national office development strategy.

At the moment, ISAO relies on INGOs for information. However, today, according to ISAO staff, out of a total of 53 partner INGOs, only about a dozen provide information. ISAO cannot, in the current deteriorating security context, continue relying on a minority. Given the low response rates, ISAO should now consider opening an office in Taizz, with the aim of establishing a structure of offices and information that extends into the sub-national level. The aim will not be to, strictly speaking, collect information – but to improve the existing dialogue with INGO provincial sub-offices and eventually, crosscheck and triangulate existing information with other networks.

5. Building a 2-way relationship with INGOs.

Relations with INGOs are too often unilateral. ISAO needs to improve its channels of information by creating an incentive so that each NGO can provide information, by understanding *which type*

of information and in which type of context. The new system of road assessment can contribute by providing an incentive to share information: as shown in annex, it is in the interest of the *road profile* users to feed them with first-hand information.

6. Transferring / Delegating risk.

Among ISAO beneficiaries, there are two types of INGOs: 1) INGOs that do have security structures or officers in place – generally big players with an experience of other conflict settings, with crisis and security management systems in place; 2) a great number of ISAO's INGO partners that are inexperienced on the security front and that do not have any formal security management system. For the latter group, ISAO is a blessing in disguise: a blessing as it provides information that is vital to these NGOs, but also a challenge as it gives the image that these NGOs have in some shape or form delegated their security assessments to ISAO. That is not the work nor the capacity of ISAO, which would lose its neutrality should it pass this threshold. However, in practice, a lot of INGOs do not have any security system in place and consider that ISAO is their *de facto* security manager. To help remedy this current *status quo*, ISAO can, after discussions with donors, be officially commissioned to undertake a rapid assessment of the security systems of all the beneficiary INGOs. A basic/comprehensive set of indicators and a typology of the existing models would be defined: each beneficiary INGO would then be ranked (e.g. red, yellow and green cards) and ISAO would provide a recommended way forward for each category of INGO identified, with a SWOT analysis, and an indicative or suggested roadmap so that they can themselves improve their own security on the short, mid and long run. This typology (e.g.) would be anonymous and ISAO's role would be to kick-start such a necessary process – which has to be implemented by the INGOs themselves. This rapid assessment would help ISAO clarify its advisory role vis-à-vis its beneficiaries while imposing them a clear and measurable security management roadmap. In a clearly deteriorating environment, donors may be interested in funding such a systematic approach: 1) ISAO is the only actor that has the legitimacy to do it; 2) it is in everyone's interest; 3) it would define a practical and actionable roadmap that would lay the emphasis on INGOs' individual responsibilities (*"Many INGOs need to act as... adults, not as beneficiaries or clients"* – INGO Security Manager, Aden).

7. Communications / Branding.

Once this new strategy has been set up – integrating the next section's programming strategy as well – ISAO will have to improve its communication efforts on both its mandate and core values. The target audience will be first and foremost the INGO partners, second external actors – whether government or anti-government groups, and third, donors.

The current review shows that 1 in 5 respondent is misled on the status of ISAO. Concerns range from an amalgam between the INGO Forum and ISAO, the question of funding and INGO participation to ISAO funding, and third, the question of a client-based vs. partnership based approach to safety and security management. A proper communications toolkit will need to include brochures, a revised mission statement and a revised email signature.

Taking as an example the email signature below – the current format used by ISAO in all of its email communications – shows that many of the current misconceptions and strategic gaps are not addressed.

The INGO Forum Safety Advisory Office (ISAO) is dedicated to providing information and advice to INGOs in Yemen for the safety of their staff, assets and programs. ISAO information

is for internal INGO use only and should not be transmitted to any external organisations without the express permission of the ISAO Project Manager. As a free service to INGOs, neither ISAO nor its donors or partners accept any liability whatsoever for claims resulting from the provision or utilisation of these free services. Whilst every effort is made to verify data, ISAO cannot guarantee the accuracy of information provided.

This “mission statement” should be revised around 3 key and defining characteristics:

- ISAO works in an advisory role to support INGOs in building their own security management
- ISAO works in partnership with INGOs – relying on a 2-way information sharing
- ISAO is a free service for INGOs in Yemen, and solely funded by its donor ECHO

III. Programming Strategy

8. Technology.

A comparison of ISAO with similar other sources of security information – such as ANSO and GANSO for instance – shows that ISAO’s approach to technology has proven both innovative and accurate. From the basic SMS and email alerts that other providers have, ISAO has managed to develop a real expertise in ArcGIS while building the awareness and capacity of their national staff on new technologies.

Now, technology should also be used as a way to incentivize INGO member participation – not only as a way to share information with them, but to have them share information with ISAO. In this regard, the future road assessment (see Annex) is an extremely promising initiative as it is two-pronged: on the one hand, it is a simple and efficient way to collect data and share information with field practitioners; on the other, it clearly creates an incentive for all field workers to actually share the information they have on hazards they may see.

9. Filling in the existing training gap.

ISAO has so far been limited in its capacity to provide additional training for its INGO members – a point raised by many of the stakeholders interviewed. ISAO’s strategy on training will have to be two-fold:

First, finding a way to bring in experienced trainers. Government suspicions of ISAO activities have resulted in a major obstacle to conducting specialized training for INGOs and strengthening this comparatively weaker component of ISAO services. It should be noted that discussions will be necessary at the donor – government level to soften tensions and open doors for ISAO to engage in more ambitious trainings.

Second, a schedule and content for trainings will have to be developed. Such a curriculum should include – (i) Trainings on safety, given the over-focus on security by INGOs, to the detriment on safety management systems. This will involve addressing both individual or personal safety, as well as the way INGO staff members think about their safety; (ii) integrating a core training component for local employees of INGOs in Arabic to address the way national staff perceive security threats, respond, monitor and track these threats. Many INGOs who currently do not have a proper security management system or a security manager or officer position, rely on their national staff for information that they currently consider as weak or lacking in focus; (iii)

Raising ISAO's appeal for thematic workshops on key humanitarian challenges; (iv) Increasing routine training of support and logistical staff, such as drivers and guards;

10. Switching from a theoretical to a practical field-based credibility.

The field credibility of ISAO is recognized by 24 per cent of respondents who state using ISAO services as checks before travelling to certain parts of the country. This raises the question as to why more beneficiaries do not systematically rely on ISAO for field checks? Given the concerns over security related to movement (carjacking and kidnappings), field assessments would seem central. Qualitative interviews suggest that beneficiaries are not entirely convinced by the coverage of ISAO's activities in all of Yemen, seeing it as a useful source of information rather than a real time source of information for the field.

The switch from a contextual service, to a more practical field-based service for NGOs needs to be emphasized and strengthened in ISAO's future activities. This can be done through our other recommendations – including the opening of other offices and the use of technology such as road map assessments.

Picture 2: NGO Staff in Sana'a



Annexes

| LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (face-to-face) | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|--------|
| Organization | Function | City |
| ISAO | Project Manager | Sana'a |
| MSF | Deputy Country Director | Sana'a |
| CARE | Security and Safety Manager | Sana'a |
| Vision Hope | Country Director | Sana'a |
| INGO Forum | Head of Office | Sana'a |
| Save the Children | Security and Safety Officer | Sana'a |
| UNDSS | Security and Safety Manager | Sana'a |
| Save the Children | Country Director | Sana'a |
| Global Communities | Country Representative | Sana'a |
| GIZ | Security Manager | Sana'a |
| Dutch Embassy | Security Manager | Sana'a |
| French Embassy | Security Manager | Sana'a |
| DRC | Country Director | Sana'a |
| Oxfam | Programme Officer | Sana'a |
| Merlin | Country Director | Sana'a |
| NRC | Country Director | Sana'a |
| CARE | Country Director | Sana'a |
| DFID | Programme Officer | Sana'a |
| ADRA | Country Director | Aden |
| ADRA | Programme Officer | Aden |
| UNDSS | Security and Safety Officer | Aden |
| MSF | Provincial Security and Safety Officer | Aden |
| ISAO | Analyst (South) | Aden |
| DRC | Provincial Security and Safety Officer | Aden |
| Mercy Corps | Regional Security and Safety Officer | Aden |
| NRC | Provincial Security and Safety Officer | Aden |
| ECHO | Technical Assistant | Sana'a |
| Mercy Corps | Country Director | Sana'a |
| Mercy Corps | Programme Officer | Sana'a |
| Mercy Corps | International Security Manager | Sana'a |
| ISAO | Analyst (North) | Sana'a |
| ISAO | Analyst (East) | Sana'a |
| MSF | Country Director | Sana'a |
| Oxfam | Security and Safety Officer | Sana'a |
| Islamic Relief | Security and Safety Officer | Sana'a |
| UNHCR | Country Director | Sana'a |
| UNICEF | Programme Officer | Sana'a |

ROAD PROFILE

| | | | | | |
|-----------|----------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------|------|
| Road Name | SAN-DHA | Kms: | 98.8 kms | Time: | 1:46 |
| From - To | ISAO Office to Dhamar City | Last Update | 27-Jul-13 | | |

Road Overview

The road between the capital city and Dhamar city is approximately 98.8km long and takes slightly under two hours to complete, which includes the time to leave the urban area of Sana'a. The road traverses the XXX mountain range, south of Sana'a governorate, at an altitude of 2,800m.

Safety

Road Surface: The road is asphalted along its entirety, though as mentioned in several areas in Sana'a governorate one side of the dual carriageway finishes without any notice. Several areas also appear also to be under 'construction' with no indication when work may be finalised and parts of the road incomplete - though this is only in a very small number of areas. **Safety:** Road travel is only advised during the day as in several areas, the dual carriageway becomes a single carriageway with little or no notice. Speedbumps are also common and have been erected by private fruit and vegetable sellers to entice people to slow down and buy their produce - this is particularly apparent in south Sana'a governorate. The long flat Jahran area has a reputation for hosting serious road accidents due to the high speeds and irresponsible driving. Caution should also be exercised through the mountain pass.

Security

As both Sana'a governorate and Dhamar host heavily tribalised communities, tribal checkpoints can be established with little or no notice, though often they are targeting members from the opposing tribe or block all commercial traffic, but allow 'families' to pass. The Sanhan turnoff area, which leads to Ma'rib; the area around Al Naqeel area and of a lesser frequency to the north and south of Ma'bar experience occasional tribal checkpoints. If the presence of checkpoints is confirmed, then travel is not advised - especially with internationals.


Medical

Ma'aba Hospital, Emergency Ward, 30 beds, Tel: XX XXXX XXX


Tracking Board

| Location | District | Kms (out) | Time (out) | Kms (in) | Time (in) | GPS | Comments |
|------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------|
| Al Rowaishan Jct | Capital City | 0.0 km(s) | 0:00 | 98.8 km(s) | 1:46 | 16° 24.628'N, 43° 3.612'E | |
| Dar Salm Jct | Capital City | 9.2 km(s) | 0:10 | 89.6 km(s) | 1:36 | | |
| SAN CP S1 | Bilad Al Rus | 28.5 km(s) | 0:33 | 70.3 km(s) | 1:13 | | |
| Walan DC | Bilad Al Rus | 33.8 km(s) | 0:36 | 65.1 km(s) | 1:10 | | |
| Bilad Al Ruse Police S | Bilad Al Rus | 35.4 km(s) | 0:40 | 63.4 km(s) | 1:06 | | |
| SAN CP S2 | Jahran | 47.4 km(s) | 0:56 | 51.4 km(s) | 0:50 | | |
| SAN CP S3 | Jahran | 53.7 km(s) | 1:05 | 45.1 km(s) | 0:41 | | |
| Ma'abar Hospital | Ma'abar | 69.2 km(s) | 1:15 | 29.6 km(s) | 0:31 | | |
| Manama Rest. | Dhamar | 82.1 km(s) | 1:30 | 16.7 km(s) | 0:16 | | |
| Hamam Ali Jct | Dhamar | 89.7 km(s) | 1:38 | 9.1 km(s) | 0:08 | | |
| DHA CP N1 | Dhamar City | 95.4 km(s) | 1:43 | 3.4 km(s) | 0:03 | | |
| Dhamar City | Dhamar City | 98.8 km(s) | 1:46 | 0.0 km(s) | 0:00 | | |

Topography



Map



Hajjah

- WHO
- UNICEF, SCI, SFD, NRC, Al Saleh
- WFP, FAO, IRY, PAI, CARE, SCI, OXFAM, SWF, CSSW, PO⁷
- UNFPA, WHO, MSSF, ADRA, YRC, IOM, MoPH
- UNHCR, DRC, INTERSOS, AL TADHAMON, YRC, IOM
- UNICEF, WFP, WHO, VHI, ACF, SCI, IRY, CSSW, MoPH
- UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, IR, DRC, DDG, Intersos, SCI, IRY, OXFAM, Shawthab, Seyaj, CSSW, YEMAC, IOM, MoSAL
- UNHCR, OXFAM, IRY, NRC, Exe U, ALAMAL, CSSW, IOM
- UNICEF, WHO, OXFAM, CARE, Exe U, NRC, VHI, AlKhair, CSSW, GARWSP, IOM, MoPH

Sa'ada

- UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, OXFAM, ICRC
- UNICEF, SDF, SCI
- WFP, OXFAM, CSSW
- UNDP, UNHCR, WHO, UNFPA, SCI, ICRC, MoPH
- UNICEF, WHO, SCI, MoPH
- UNICEF, UNHCR, Al-Bena, Seyaj, DS, Shawthab, YWU¹, MoSAL, ICER
- UNHCR, Al Amal
- UNICEF, WHO, OXFAM, ICRC, Exe U, Al Amal, MoE, MoPH

Al Maharah

- AL SALEH
- WFP, CSSW

Al Mahwit

- AL SALEH
- WFP, CSSW
- UNICEF, MoPH
- SEYAJ

Al Jawf

- AL SALEH
- CSSW, NM⁵, THFY, IOM
- ADRA, IOM
- UNHCR, DRC, YRC, Intersos, Al Tadhmon
- UNICEF, ADRA, CSSW, IOM, MoPH
- SEYAJ
- THFY
- ADRA, IOM

Raymah

- Al Saleh
- WFP, THFY, CSSW
- UNICEF, ACTED, PU-AMI, MoPH
- Seyaj
- THFY

Dhamar

- CLP, Al Saleh
- WFP, Exe U, CSSW
- UNICEF, MoPH
- Seyaj
- UNHCR, CSSW

Shabwah

- Al Saleh
- WFP, CSSW
- UNHCR, DRC, Intersos, YRC, SHS, Al Tadhmon
- UNICEF, FMF, MoPH
- UNHCR, UNFPA, DRC, DDG, Intersos
- UNHCR, SHS

Sana'a

- UNICEF, SFD, CLP, CSSW, Al Saleh, WFP, FAO
- IMC, ICRC
- UNICEF, Intersos, DRC, IOM, IPNA
- UNICEF, IMC, MC, MoPH
- SCI, DRC, DDG, MC, Seyaj, CPI
- ADRA, Exe U
- ADRA, IMC, MC, VHI, CSSW

Amran

- UNICEF, SFD, SCI, CLP, CSSW, Al Saleh
- WFP, SC, CSSW, HCDA⁶
- UNFPA, MSFF, SCI, ICRC
- UNICEF, WFP, CSSW, MoPH
- UNICEF, UNFPA, IRY, DRC, SCI, DDG, Seyaj, YEMAC, MoSAL
- UNHCR, YRC, CSSW, IOM
- CARE, YWU¹, CSSW, LC⁹, VWC¹¹, GIZ

Al Dhale'e

- Al Saleh
- WFP, ADRA, NRC, CSSW, SHS, AWE², ICRC
- UNICEF, DRC, MSSF, FMF
- UNICEF, FMF, MoPH
- UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, DRC, Intersos, Seyaj, MoSAL
- ACTED

Amant Al Asimah

- DRC
- SFD, SCI, CLP, CSSW, Al Saleh
- WFP, CSSW
- IOM
- UNICEF, WHO, MoPH
- UNICEF, UNHCR, ADRA, IOM, DDG, DRC, Intersos, Seyaj, Shwthab., CPI
- UNHCR, IOM
- ADRA, CSSW

Al Hudaydah


- UNDEF, OXFAM, DRC, THFY, NM⁵, YWU
- UNICEF, Al Saleh
- WFP, ACF, OXFAM, SWF, SC, ACTED, IRY, PO⁷, YWU, Al Mostakbal, Al mawda, CSSW
- UNICEF, ADRA, SCI
- UNHCR, DRC, Intersos, YRC, Al Tadhmon
- UNICEF, WFP, WHO, SCI, PU-AMI, VHI, ACF, Exe U, Merlin, CSSW, YFCA, MoPH
- UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, DRC, Intersos, Seyaj
- UNHCR, Al Amal
- UNICEF, OXFAM, SCI, ACF, VHI, ACTED, IRD, NWRA, Ptogresso, Al-Khair, GARWSP

Taizz

- DRC, GC⁸
- UNICEF, SD, CLP, CSSW, Al Saleh
- WFP, SCI, MC, CSSW, THFY, PO⁷
- IMC, SCI
- YRC, IOM
- UNICEF, WFP, SCI, IMC, CSSW, MoPH
- UNICEF, MC, Attakaful, Seyaj
- Exe U
- MC, Mercy YM, RSD¹², TSDF¹³

Lahj

- MC, GC⁸, NM⁵
- UNICEF, SFD, GPE, CLP, Al Saleh
- WFP, ADRA, SC, IR, CARE, CSSW
- WHO, UNFPA, SCI
- UNHCR, DRC, Intersos, YRC, IOM, Al Tadhmon
- UNICEF, WFP, WHO, MC, SCI, FMF, MoPH
- UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, DRC, SCI, Intersos, YEMAC, YWU¹, Seyaj
- UNHCR, SHS
- UNICEF, WHO, SCI, ACF, GC, GIZ, FMF



Aden

- UNDEF, DRC, MC, NM⁵, THFY, GC⁸
- UNICEF, GPE, OXFAM, Intersos, SFD, SCI, CLP, Private Sector, CSSW, Al Saleh
- WFP, CSSW, NM⁵, IOM
- WHO, UNFPA, DRC, Intersos, MSSF, SCI, IRC, CR, ICRC, IOM, CLP, MoPH
- UNHCR, UNICEF, DRC, Intersos, YRC, Al Tadhmon, IOM, IPNA
- UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IRC, SCI, MSFF, YWU, ROFHD, WES, CSSW, FMF, MoPH
- UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, DRC, DDG, SCI, Intersos, OXFAM, IOM, SHS, CPA, Seyaj, AWE², YEMAC, WACP, SSA, ECCD
- IOM
- UNICEF, ADRA, SFD, SCI, LC⁹, PS, GC, IOM, GPE, SSC

Abyan

- UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, FAO, QC, DRC, QDRA, MC, ICRC, Intersos, NRC, IRY, NM⁵, CSSW, GC⁸, SHS, YEMAC, YALS, FMF, ECHO, IOM, SDF
- UNICEF, NRC, SFD, CLP, CSSW, Al Saleh
- FAO, WFP, NRC, CARE, ADRA, SHS, THFY, AWE², CSSW, ICRC
- WHO, UNFPA, IRC, Intersos, MSFF, CSSW, IOM, FMF, ICRC
- UNHCR, DRC, Intersos, YRC, SHS, Al Tadhmon
- UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IRC, CSSW, ICRC, FMF, IOM, MoPH
- UNHCR, UNFPA, DRC, DDG, OXFAM, SCI, Intersos, YEMAC³, YWU¹, Regeeb, IOM, SHS
- UNHCR, DRC, ADRA, Exe U, MC, NRC, CSSW, THFY, SHS, AYWD⁴
- UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, NRC, SFD, ADRA, MC, OXFAM, IRC, SHS, GC, WE⁹, CSSW, GARWSP, NM, ICRC, CLP, IOM, MoE

Ibb

- CLP, AL SALEH
- WFP, FAO, CSSW, ACTED
- UNICEF, MoPH
- Seyaj
- ACTED

Al Bayda

- Al Saleh
- WFP, CSSW, Exe U
- UNICEF, WFP, MoPH
- Al Saleh

Hadramaut

- UNDEF, THFY, GIZ
- Al Saleh
- WFP, CSSW
- WHO, GIZ, ALAWN, MoPH
- SHS
- UNICEF, WFP, MoPH
- Seyaj, YEMAC

91 partners in
21 Governorates
5 Gov. Agencies
8 UN Agencies
39 INGOs
39 Local NGOs

Number of Humanitarian Partners

- 0 - 10
- 11 - 20
- 21 - 30
- 31 - 40
- 41 - 50

Cluster/Sector

- Early Recovery
- Education
- Food Security & Agriculture
- Health
- Multi Cluster
- Nutrition
- Protection
- Shelter/NFI/CCCM
- WASH

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